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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over cases transferred to the Court
of Appeals from the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). The
Utah Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3102(j) over this case which was transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78A-3-102(4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the District Court err in its Order on Outstanding Motions dated June

22, 2009 [R. 3933] by awarding defendants as sanctions only the sum of $7,475 with
respect to defendants' Second Motion for Sanctions dated June 24, 2008, which the Court
granted?
Standard of Review: The standard of review is abuse of discretion. Bodell
Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, «|[ 16.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the District Court through
defendants' Second Motion for Sanctions dated June 24, 2008 [R. 2215] (which was filed
before trial and sought dismissal with prejudice of plaintiffs' Complaint and an award of
attorneys' fees) and in oral argument of the Second Motion for Sanctions (following the
Jury's rejection of all claims in the Complaint) during which defendants' counsel
requested that the District Court order PC Crane and its counsel at a minimum to pay all
legal fees that McQueen incurred as a result of their misrepresentations and concealments
concerning the subject trailer during discovery. [R. 4003, T. 76-77].

1
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2.

Did the District Court err in its Order on Outstanding Motions dated June

22, 2009 [R. 3933] by denying defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and
Expenses dated November 3, 2008?

,

Standard of Review: The standard of review is correctness. EDSA/Cloward,
LLCv. Klibanoff, 2008 UT App. 284, 192 P.3d 296.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the District Court through
defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses dated November 3, 2008
[R. 3477] and Memorandum in support thereof [R. 3480].
3.

Did the District Court err in its Order on Outstanding Motions dated June

22, 2009 [R. 3933] by denying defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and
Expenses against Guarantors dated December 19, 2008?
Standard of Review: The standard of review is correctness. EDSA/Cloward,
LLC v. Klibanojfc 2008 UT App. 284, 192 P.3d 296.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in defendants' Motion for Award

<

of Attorney's Fees and Expenses Against Guarantors dated December 19, 2008 [R. 3842]
and Memorandum in support thereof [R. 3845].
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of this appeal or of central importance to this
appeal.
i
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For the remainder of this Brief, plaintiff PC Crane, LLC will hereinafter be
referred to as "PC Crane," defendants David Belcher, Vernon Belcher, and Paul Belcher
(all owners of PC Crane) will hereinafter collectively be referred to as "Belchers,"
Belchers' company, LACY, LLC, will be referred to as "Lacy," and defendants McQueen
Masonry, Inc., Central Equipment, LC, McQueen Crane Services, LC, and James
McQueen will collectively be referred to as "McQueen."
Nature of the Case
This appeal is about attorney's fees and discovery abuse. Appellants McQueen
prevailed on all issues before the Jury.
PC Crane, in two separate transactions, contracted to purchase from McQueen (i)
cranes and (ii) "goodwill" associated with those cranes. PC Crane claims it paid
McQueen for "goodwill" through two Promissory Notes (the "Goodwill Notes"). David
and Vernon Belcher and Lacy (the "Guarantors") guaranteed PC Crane's obligations to
McQueen. PC Crane and the Guarantors initiated this action against McQueen to escape
liability under the Goodwill Notes.
The most critical evidence for McQueen was in the hands of PC Crane and
Belchers, who over an extended period attempted through persistent obstruction and
misrepresentations to hide from McQueen the most relevant facts and documents.1 After

l

We are mindful that courts are generally not receptive to such charges,
particularly when they are leveled at reputable firms or attorneys. But when parties
actually engage in such behavior, as they will be shown to have done here, their behavior
deserves candid recognition and fair redress.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
3 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

extensive discovery enforcement procedures, McQueen finally obtained the critical
evidence and prevailed oh all issues before the Jury.
On this appeal, McQueen first seeks a fair sanction for this gross discovery abuse.
Second, McQueen seeks to recover their attorney's fees in defending against PC Crane's
and the Guarantors' unsuccessful effort to escape liability under the Goodwill Notes.
Course of Proceedings
PC Crane and the Guarantors initiated this action on September 15, 2006. [R. 1].
The case was tried to a Jury between October 20 and 24, 2008. The Jury returned a
Special Verdict in favor of McQueen, which rejected all of PC Crane and the Guarantors'
claims. [R. 3316]. The Honorable L. A. Dever presided over this case from its inception
through trial. McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions was filed prior to trial, but Judge
Dever declined to hear it. After prevailing at trial, McQueen on October 31, 2008 moved
to disqualify Judge Dever [R. 3374]. Judge Dever disqualified himself on November 3,
2008 [R. 3519] and the case was assigned to the Honorable Robin R. Reese [R. 3521],

i

who heard the motions at issue on this appeal. Final Judgment was entered August 18,
2009 [R. 3971]. This appeal followed [R. 3982].
<

Disposition in the Court Below
Following trial, through the Order on Outstanding Motions entered June 23, 2009
[R. 3933], Judge Reese (i) granted McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions dated June
24, 2008 and awarded McQueen sanctions of $7,475.00, and (ii) denied McQueen's
Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses dated November 23, 2008 and

<
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i

McQueen's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Expenses Against Guarantors dated
December 19, 2008.
Statement of Facts
As noted, this appeal is about attorney's fees and discovery abuse. McQueen
prevailed on all substantive issues before the Jury. This Statement of Facts will be
presented in three sections: (1) The facts from which PC Crane/Guarantors' claims arose,
(2) the discovery abuses themselves, and (3) the facts pertinent to McQueen's claim for
recovery of attorney's fees based on the parties'contracts.
I.

Facts Pertinent to the Parties' Claims
McQueen and PC Crane (a company owned by Belchers) entered into two separate

agreements involving the sale of cranes and the goodwill associated with those cranes one in October, 2004 [Ex. 2] and one in April, 2005 [Ex. 7]. 2 PC Crane claimed the
"goodwill" in each transaction was paid through a Promissory Note. [R. 3, ^J 25; R. 6, ^
33-34]. The Addendum includes copies of both Goodwill Notes [Exs. 83 and 1 1 Addendum pp. 4 and 1], which were included as exhibits to the parties' two Agreements.
[Exs. 2 and 7].
PC Crane argued that "goodwill" was mainly a transfer to PC Crane of McQueen's

2

Some closing documents bear typewritten dates in March, 2005, but the
documents were actually executed and the transaction closed April 14-15, 2005. [R.
1910; R. 3499-3503; V. Belcher Depo. R. 1899, pp. 23-25; D. Belcher Depo. R. 1902-03,
pp. 70-71.]
3

PC Crane asserted that, of this Note's face amount of $177,600, $132,600 was
attributed to the "goodwill" payment. [R, 16, Tf 88; R. 23, ^ 144-45.]
5
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customers who used the cranes in question. [R. 12-13, ^ 60-71]. PC Crane alleged that
McQueen had utilized a crane broker named Lon Stam ("Stam"), who had most of the
crane customer relationships and that McQueen fraudulently misrepresented and hid from
PC Crane the fact that Stam was his crane broker and had substantially all of the customer
contacts [R. 12-13,ffif64-71; R. 22-23,ffif134-142; R. 23,ffif146-150]. McQueen, on the
other hand, asserted that "goodwill" included McQueen's many efforts to facilitate PC
Crane's starting out in the crane business and McQueen's effort to transition customers
from McQueen to PC Crane. As concerns Stam, Jamie McQueen asserted that he told
Belchers that Stam was his crane broker, he gave Belchers records plainly showing that
Stam brokered a large fraction of McQueen's crane work, and he introduced Belchers to
Stam so that PC Crane could make whatever deal they wanted with Stam.
Belchers testified in their depositions that they did not know who Stam was or
what he did and had no substantive conversations with him until following the second
crane transaction4 (which closed in mid-April, 20055). During discovery, McQueen

(

repeatedly asserted that Belchers and Stam knew all about each other and Stam's
involvement in McQueen*5s business long before the April, 2005 transaction, that Stam
and Belchers communicated extensively during that period, and, indeed, Belchers told
McQueen they had made a deal with Stam to assist them with their business before the
.

—

i

4

Stam Depo. R. 1570-71, pp. 96-98; D. Belcher Depo., R. 1564-65, pp. 53-56 (the
777 transaction to which Stam and Belchers refer is the April, 2005 transaction).
5

Some closing documents bear typewritten dates in March, 2005, but the
documents were executed and the transaction closed April 14-15, 2005. See Note 2,
supra.
6
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J

second transaction in April, 2005 [Eg., R, 833; R. 941-42; R. 1538]. Thus, the central
issue in this case was whether PC Crane/Belchers had any substantive
communications or relationship with Stam before the second crane transaction in
April, 2005.
2.

PC Crane's Discovery Abuse
After Belchers and Stam testified in their depositions (it turns out falsely) that they

did not know each other until after the second crane transaction that closed in April, 2005,
McQueen sought through discovery to obtain from PC Crane, Belchers, and Stam (the
only source for such information) evidence that would prove that they had testified
falsely. McQueen, through requests for production to PC Crane [R. 866, ^ 3; R. 873-74,
fflj 3, 4, 5] and a Subpoena to Stam [R. 142, Yff 2, 5, 8], sought a copy of the Commission
Agreement that Belchers and Stam all testified existed6 between PC Crane and Stam
through which Stam was paid a 10% commission to broker crane work for PC Crane. PC
Crane never produced the Commission Agreement.7 McQueen moved to compel [R. 828,
832]. PC Crane claimed that an unexecuted draft document (numbered PC 697-98 [R.
1682] included in Addendum at pp. 16-17) represented the only such document [R. 92425; R. 966]. Interestingly, PC Crane's counsel initially refused to produce this document
claiming that it had not been shown to third parties and was protected as work product.

6

Stam Depo. [R. 852-855]; D. Belcher Depo. [R. 857-859]; P. Belcher Depo. [R.
861-862].
7

PC Crane objected that this simple, obviously relevant request was overly broad,
burdensome, and irrelevant [R. 873, Req. No. 3].
7
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[R. 924, n. 3]. This document was obviously not the Commission Agreement that Stam
and Belchers all testified existed: Belchers and Stam testified that the subject
Commission Agreement was executed by all parties (Stam Depo. [R. 853]; D. Belcher
Depo. [R. 858-59]). The unexecuted draft document offered by PC Crane (dated May,
2005) addressed Stam's option to acquire an equity interest in PC Crane and seemed to
suggest that it changed Stam's commission ("the referral fee . . . shall hence forth be
. . ."). [R. 1682; Addendum p. 16]. In addition, Stam testified that there were two
Agreements between Stam and PC Crane — one covering the commission relationship
between Stam and PC Crane and one through which Stam acquired an interest in PC
Crane (Stam Depo. [R. 853-54]). Paul Belcher even testified that the Commission
Agreement was executed in March, 2005. [P. Belcher Depo. (R. 862, pp. 158-59)]. The
District Court, twice, ordered the Commission Agreement produced [R. 1098, <f[ 2(d); R.
2082, f2]. PC Crane's counsel alternatively argued, inconsistently, that (i) there was no
such written agreement covering Stam's commission [R. 924-25; R. 4001, T. pp. 40-42],
and (ii) when the District Court noted that it was "odd" that PC Crane was paying Stam
"all this money" based on no agreement, PC Crane's counsel said, "[P]erhaps there's a
signed one out there. My client can't find a copy of it." [R. 4002, T. 30-31]. Because PC
Crane and Stam never produced the executed Commission Agreement that both Stam and
Belchers testified existed, McQueen was not able to show it and its date (which was the
critical fact) to the Jury.
McQueen then sought through interrogatory all of Belchers' and Stam's telephone

8
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numbers so that their telephone records could be subpoenaed. PC Crane refused to give
McQueen the telephone numbers for Stam, claiming that Stam was not a party to the case
[R. 879]. At the time PC Crane asserted this frivolous objection, Stam was an owner of
PC Crane. Natin :

Jiout all of Stam's phone numbers, the phone records of the

Belchers would be useless to show contacts with Stam.8 After McQueen filed their first
Motion to Compel, defendants supplied Stam's phone numbers, thereby demonstrating
that they knew them. •

long and tl n it ll leii objections to procit icii ig this known

information was a sham [R. 925]. McQueen subpoenaed the cell phone records of Stam
and the Belchers. Those telephone records demonstrated about 80 contacts between the
Belchers and Stam prior to the second crane transaction's closing. [Ex, 1109]. Thus,
Belchers aiid Stam, who previously testified under oatli they had no substantive contact
and didn't know who each other was before the second crane transaction, spoke together
by cell phone on more than 80 occasions in the three and a half months or so before the
closing of the second crane transaction.
I he cell phone records, however, did not reveal the content of the Belcher-Stam
communications, and neither Stam nor PC Crane ever produced the Commission
Agreement that they all testified they executed, which woiild have revealed the date of
their arrangement. PC Crane had told McQueen it had made a deal with Stam before the
8

PC Crane later sought to justify its refusal with the claim that McQueen already
knew Stam's number. McQueen did know some of Stam's numbers, but this obviously
does not justify PC Crane's refusal to disclose this relevant information.
9

R. 1585-1621; Ex. 110 has highlighted the calls between Stam and Belchers.
Stam's numbers are revealed at R. 925, and Belchers' numbers are revealed at R. 879-80.
9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

second crane transaction. To convince a Jury that he had not hidden Stam's important
role from Belchers and that Belchers had a relationship with Stam before the second crane
transaction, McQueen needed an indication that Belchers and Stam were actively
cooperating in the crane business before the second transaction in April, 2005. McQueen
believed that, in connection with applying for financing for its brand new company, PC
Crane may have given lenders business plans that included references to Stam and his
role in the PC Crane business. McQueen therefore on June 5, 2007 submitted to PC
Crane's lenders, including Bank of American Fork, a Subpoena Duces Tecum seeking
production of all such materials [R. 424]. PC Crane moved to quash the subpoena to
Bank of American Fork and other lenders on the grounds that the Subpoena improperly
sought "irrelevant" information that was "confidential"10 [R. 462-469]. After the District
Court refused to quash the subpoena seeking that information [R. 1096, ^ 1], McQueen
obtained from Bank of American Fork11 the document that ultimately destroyed PC
Crane's case — PC Crane's own description of its involvement with Stam [Ex. 61]. The
most relevant portions of that document are included in the Addendum at pp. 18-26 (the
"Bank Disclosure"). First, this document stated (in stark contrast to Belchers' deposition
testimony that they were forced to use Stam's services) as follows:

10

McQueen had already stipulated to a Protective Order protecting the
confidentiality of such documents [R. 167].
n

PC Crane produced a portion of the same document. PC Crane initially asserted
it was "irrelevant" and then steadfastly obstructed its production for over 5 months. [See
R. 1888-1889 and attached Exhibits referred to therein, which outlines this remarkable
obstruction.]
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In our [PC Crane's] efforts to build a strong marketing
position we searched out one of the most well-connected crane
brokers in the entire region. Lon Stam . . . has more than 30 years of
brokering crane service in Utah. Lon Stam has provided a high level
of credibility to our crane company.
And then in the same document PC Crane (n liicli w r Mini doing business as McQueen
Crane) stated the following:
One of the operational decisions that we [PC Crane] and Lon
[Stam] collaborated on was in the building of a custom-designed
trailer that gives us the ability to use our 300 ton hydraulic Liebherr
crane as either a 300 ton crane or a 165 ton crane. This is the
primary reason for the drastic increase in the annual revenue
production of this machine.
*

#

*

The crawler cranes are the next business endeavor that we
[PC Crane] are collaborating with Lon to undertake. The
opportunity to purchase the crawlers came via Lon through a long
time business associate Gordon Olsen. [Ex. 61, p. BAF 154.]
A part of the same document obtained from Bank of American Fork (this part was absent
from the document PC Crane produced) demonstrated that the "crawler cranes" business
endeavor w ill i Goi d :>i I Olsen (win- ••

Vane in the Bank Disclosure said was its "next"

collaboration after the trailer with Stam) occurred in late 2005 [Ex. 61, pp. BAF 171-175;
Addendum pp. 22-26] — therefore, the Stam-Belcher collaboration on building a customdesigned trailer necessarily occurred before the end of 2005.
In the eight-plus months that followed, McQueen expended multiple tens of
thousands of dollars in legal fees in seeking to prove what turned out to be the truth — PC
Crane had created ONLY ONE custom-designed, modified trailer, and that trailer was
modifi

:

the February, 2005 to !\Ian:h, 2005
11

frame ~ before the second
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crane transaction with McQueen and during the time when Belchers and Stam uniformly
testified they didn't know who each other was. The Second Motion for Sanctions sought
redress for PC Crane and its attorneys' obstructionist and dishonest behavior throughout
that long, extremely expensive process.
Thumbnail Sketch. Here is a thumbnail sketch of what happened, which is
outlined in sequential detail below. What PC Crane and its attorneys did was to take the
position with McQueen's*attorney and the Court that the custom-designed trailer on
which PC Crane and Stam collaborated actually existed12 but was constructed after the
"relevant period" established by the Court (the end of 2005) and that, accordingly, they
did not have to supply any information about it. When McQueen, through a private
detective, identified a trailer that was modified by PC Crane in early 2005 consistently
with the description in the Bank Disclosure, PC Crane and its counsel conceded that this
was a trailer that was modified by PC Crane in early 2005, but it was not the trailer that
Stam and Belchers collaborated on to which reference was made in the Bank Disclosure
— rather, the trailer referred to in the Bank Disclosure was collaborated on and modified
after the end of 2005. After about 8 months of litigating this issue, PC Crane and its
counsel were finally required by the District Court to produce the documents and
information concerning the modification of the post-2005 trailer that PC Crane and its

,2

It obviously existed — otherwise, how could this modified trailer have been the
"primary reason for the drastic increase in the annual revenue production of [their
cranes]" as PC Crane stated in the Bank Disclosure?
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counsel 1lad been saying again and again existed13 and was the one mentioned in the Bank
Disclosure. Now faced with having to prove that a post-2005 modified trailer existed (as
PC Crane and its counsel repeatedly told the District Court and McQueen's counsel), they
completely c :

ncir story and stated that no such trailer ever existed or was ever

constructed or modified. That is, (i) PC Crane's statement to Bank of American Fork that
it and Stam "collaborated on . . . in the building of a custom-designed trailer [and] . . . .
that is the primary reason for the drastic increase in the annual revenue production of this
machine" «;ts i < nmph (c 1 list hood, and (ii) that PC Crane and its counsel's i nultiple
statements to the Court and McQueen's counsel that the trailer referred to in that
quotation was in fact collaborated on and built after the end of 2005 was also a complete
falsehood. In fact, however, the trailer modified in February an

n Ii 200 was the

(nil",, ii ailer III,it: was ever modified by PC Crane, ana us modification was consistent with
PC Crane's description of its purpose in the Bank Disclosure.
Here is the disturbing story of McQueen's effort to prove that the only trailer that
could possibly have beei i the one thai Slim ,imi Bdi ln-iit modified and utllLiboialoJ on
was modified in February to March, 2005:
What Happened Sequentially. McQueen on July 3, 2007 served its Third Set of
Interrogatories and Request for Production requesting information concerning dates of
constrm lion ol ihr Irailn, \\ ho pailic ipaled in its modification, and documents
concerning those subjects. [R. 662; R. 947]. PC Crane filed identical, patently frivolous
13

Id.
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objections to ah such requests objecting that they were "overly broad, unduly
burdensome, and . . . not relevant" and refused to respond. [R. 947]. McQueen, on
August 3, 2007, moved the Court to extend the discovery schedule dates for 2 months
because PC Crane had, through Motions to Quash and objections, stalled McQueen's
discovery [R. 903]. PC Crane objected to McQueen's requested extension because
McQueen's discovery was seeking "irrelevant" information [R. 956]. McQueen's
counsel, Maak, sent PC Crane's counsel, Burghardt, an email August 10, 2007 explaining
the obvious relevance of the information sought through the Third Set and requesting
production. [R. 2279]. Burghardt responded by letter stating that prior to April 2005,
"PC Crane and Mr. Stam had no communications or interaction concerning the subject
trailer." [R. 2281]. On August 13, 2007 Burghardt emailed Maak saying that he would
respond to the interrogatories if they were limited to the period between October, 2004
and April, 2005. [R. 2284]. Maak emailed Burghardt indicating he was unwilling to
limit the time period to prior to April 2005. [R. 2287].
McQueen on August 10, 2007 moved to compel responses to the Third Set of
Interrogatories and Requests. [R. 940]. In its response filed August 30, 2007, PC Crane
indicated that McQueen sought information about the trailer in question and then stated:
"Even though plaintiffs believe the records concerning the subject trailer are not relevant
to the issues in this case, they are willing to respond to the Discovery Requests if limited
to the relevant time period of October, 2004 to March, 2005." PC Crane requested that

14

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the Court limit McQueen's discovery to the period prior to March, 2005.14 [R. 994,
R. 997-98]. At the hearing before the Court on McQueen's Motion to Compel, Burghardt
stated as follows to the Court: "[T]here was a document produced by us [the Bank
Disclosure] that made some reference to Mr. Stam and PC Crane ccr.ti-^rating on a
trailer. This trailer. Your Honor, as we certified in a letter, this collaboration occurred
much after the purchase of the fourth crane in April of 2005. It was well into the year
2006." Later he stated, "The trailer wasn't even conceived of until the year 2006 between
Stam and the Belchers. At that time, a year and a half after they purchased the first
cranes, there clearly is no relevance to their collaboration on this trailer." [R. 4001; T.
50-52]. Burghardt thus represented to the Court that the subject trailer and collaboration
occurred, but after the end ol 2005 and that McQueen's requests for information about it
were irrelevant. The District Court on November 2, 2007 entered an Order on Motion to
Quash and Motions to Compel, which required production of all documents relating to the
trailer prior to December, 2005.15 [R. 1096, ^ 2(e)]. In response, Burghardt sent Maak a
letter stating that "plaintiffs have no responsive documents."16 [R. 230 ].
McQueen then sent its Fourth Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production,

14

So long as PC Crane could prevent McQueen from discovering on the very trailer
(whenever built) that PC Crane and Stam claimed they modified together, PC Crane could
continue to perpetuate the false claim that the subject trailer existed, but was modified
long after the second crane transaction. As will be seen, this is what they did
15

Judge Dever accommodated PC Crane's request to limit the discovery period in
this manner.
,6

As predicted, PC Crane claimed that there were no documents relating to the
modified trailer prior to December 2005.
15
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which in paragraph 4 requested that PC Crane identify all drop deck trailers [i.e., the
trailer variety that was modified] that it owned . [R. 1555, ^j 4]. PC Crane objected to the
request again frivolously claiming that it was over broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks
irrelevant information. [R. 1555]. In an effort to terminate further discovery, PC Crane
filed a Request for Trial Setting on December 4, 2007 [R. 1521] which certified,
incorrectly, that "[d]iscovery is completed and . . . the case is ready for trial." Through a
private detective's efforts, McQueen discovered the modified trailer and that it had been
modified in Spring 2005. On December 7, 2007, Maak wrote Burghardt, observed that
the Court had ordered production of documents relating to the trailer prior to December,
2005, and that he had independently verified the existence of the trailer. Maak stated:
We intend to seek sanctions if the documents relating to this trailer
and the answer to Interrogatory No. 4 are not immediately
forthcoming. When we do, and when this matter plays out, we do
not want you or your client to be able to say that there was some
innocent mistake made. You and your client are on notice that the
trailer in question was made and titled during the time period for
which production was ordered by the Court. If these documents are
not produced now, in response to this very pointed request, it will be
clear that they have been intentionally withheld. [R. 2309]
Burghardt responded, drawing a cute distinction between the date of the original
manufacture of the subject trailer and the date of its modification. He suggested that,
although the "original unmodified trailer" was manufactured earlier, the Court's Order
addressed "the manufacture of the customized trailer." Burghardt stated that PC Crane
had "no documents relating to the manufacture of the 'custom designed trailer' prior to

16
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December 2005." 17 [R. 2312].
McQueen filed its Third Motion to Compel on December 13, 2007 seeking
production of documents relating to any trailer modified by PC Crane and requiring PC
Crane to identif

rniler identifier

.

i- <.••

5i

•-• • •• PC Crane ;u a Stam

collaborated on) [R. 1533]. In its response dated January 4, 2008, PC Crane stated that it
objected to the request "because it sought information outside of the scope of discovery
authorized by the Court" — that is, for the period after December 31, 2005 — and that
McQueen's seeking such intormation to ensure that PC Crane was not hiding documents
was improper.18 [R. 1633-34,^37-38]. Later they stated that "Plaintiffs have certified
at least three times that they have no documents for the 'custom designed trailer'
originating before December 2005."19 [R. '

.

At tlle 1tearing of McQueen's Third Motion to Compel on March 4, 2008,
argument by both sides focused on the existence of two modified trailers, and (1)
McQueen's need to determine which of these two was the one that was the subject of
Stam-Belcl lei s collaboration, and (2) PC Crane's assertion tl ia.1: the second ti ailei > vl rich

17

Again, Burghardt is suggesting that the subject unmodified trailer existed earlier,
but its customization occurred after 2005 — a complete falsehood.
1

throughout the process, PC Crane's attorneys asserted, indignantly, that
McQueen's counsel was wrong to assert that PC Crane's counsel was not being entirely
forthcoming. That is a tactic that credible attorneys can usefully employ. It redoubles the
seriousness of the behavior presented here. PC Crane's counsel attempted to terminate
the discovery based on their credibility with respect to statements they knew to be false.
I9

As will be shown, PC Crane finally produced documents for the only custom
designed trailer that PC Crane ever built dated in February-March, 2005, which
demonstrates that this representation to the Court was also false.
17
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was the one Stam and Belchers collaborated on, was not relevant because it was created
after December, 2005. In PC Crane's counsel's own words, at this hearing, they
"represented that the Fontaine [the trailer modified in early 2005] and the 'custom
designed trailer' were two different trailers" [R. 2427, If 30] and that "[a]t the March 4
[2008] hearing [PC Crane] informed the Court and counsel that the trailer modified in
March 2005 [the Fontaine trailer] was a different one than Vern [Belcher] modified, and
was not the 'custom designed trailer' . . . ." [R. 2428, ^ 36]. As will be shown, these
representations were also false.
McQueen expressed frustration that PC Crane was not allowing discovery on both
trailers, which prevented McQueen from knowing which of the two trailers was the one
on which Stam and Belchers collaborated:
[MR. MAAK:] Now, we have independent information that the
modified trailer was built and modified in the February /March 2005 time
frame and it was a drop-deck trailer. So here in PC's documents, we have
evidence that they are disbursing money in March of 2005 to repair and
build a drop-deck trailer.
*

*

*

Now, the Court entered its order compelling PC Crane to produce all
the documents about modification, titling and so forth of this specific
trailer. And they responded that there are none.
After they responded that there are none, I wrote them a letter and I
said, "We know that it happened. If you don't produce them, it's going to
be clear that you intentionally withheld them." They still said, 'They don't
exist."
So they have a problem here. The only way they can escape this
problem — if the Court allows us to finish our discovery on this — only way
they can escape is to say that the drop-deck trailer referred to in tab 3 is not
18
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the one; there's another one somewhere. So I sent them an interrogatory
and I asked them to identify every drop-deck trailer they owned between
October of c04 and December of '05 and tell me which one is the one that's
referred to in this narrative. Their response? "We won't tell you anything.
We object. It's overbroad. It's unduly burdensome, it's irrelevant, it's
outside the scope of the Court's order."
Now, I'm informed that they've owned two drop-deck trailers. Is it
burdensome to tell me what they are? It is surely relevant. Is it outside the
scope of the Court's order? The Court's order didn't tell me I couldn't ask
anymore questions. But the Court's order had as its cutoff date December
31, 2005. And I asked for trailers, drop-deck trailers prior to that date.
Now, I submit to the Court - I don't say this lightly - that objection
in this context is frivolous, it's advanced in bad faith, it's baseless, and in
the context of this dispute, it demonstrates what I have been going through
for the last year and a half.
Again, I do not say this lightly. PC Crane is intentionally refusing to
give us discovery information that is absolutely critical to our case that this
Court has ordered produced.
[R. 4002, ]

-12].

Mr. Barneck stated as follows:
[T]he Court said, in its Order - and we — that's what we're
going by — in paragraph 2(e) it says, "All documents created prior to
December, 2005 concerning the design, production, and mamifacture
or construction of that certain custom designed trailer."
Your Honor, there aren't any documents and Counsel can
believe there are until the cows come home, but that won't create
documents that don't exist. Did they collaborate? Yes, they did.
What was the time of that collaboration? I don't know. I don't
agree with Counsel's assertion that because the next paragraph says
the next business endeavor means that it was the next one in
chronological order? I don't know what they meant by that. But
they did collaborate and there just aren't any documents.
Mr. Barneck continued:

19
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PC Crane wanted a drop-deck trailer like this, they wanted to
create one. This [trailer modified in 2005] was for a different crane.
It was for the 165 Liebherr. The other one that Counsel's
complaining about from the loan documents was for the 300.
Different crane.
. . . Vern [Belcher] went out and bought one and - and worked
on it himself. And that was the expense for it. It's not the same one;
it was built for a different crane.
[R. 4002, T. 38-39].
The Court made clear that the issue was whether the modified trailer discovered by
McQueen was the same as the trailer at issue in this case, on which Stam and Belchers
collaborated:
THE COURT: It appears to me that the plaintiffs should produce
copies of the information concerning the modification of whatever trailer
was done to establish whether or not it was the same trailer that's at issue in
this particular case. And so any information about work on trailers done
between March of '05 and December of '05, on any trailer, should be
produced to the defendants.
[R. 4002, p. 66].
On March 20, 2008, the District Court entered an Order on McQueen's Third
Motion to Compel and Motion to Impose Sanctions requiring PC Crane to supply all
documents reflecting work done to modify any drop deck trailers owned by plaintiffs
prior to December 31, 2005 and to allow McQueen to depose PC Crane's principals on
the subject of work done to modify any drop deck trailer. [R. 2081]. In response to that
Order, Burghardt sent Maak a letter dated March 26, 2008 in which PC Crane completely
changed its position on the subject trailer — instead of continuing to assert and by his own
admission again and again "certify" [R. 4001; T. 50-52] that the "subject trailer" had been
20
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built long after December, 2005, PC Crane and its counsel now stated that "THE
TRAILER . . . WAS NEVER BUILT"! [R. 2334]. In other words, once the Court
allowed discovery that would demonstrate that the "subject trailer" was in fact modified
in March and April, 2005, PC Crane changed the position that it had been certifying and
representing to the Court and to McQueen for 8 months from the claim that there were
two modified trailers and the "subject trailer" was modified in 2006 to the position that
there was only one such trailer and the subject trailer was never built at all and did not
exist.
The depositions of the Belchers and Stam that were allowed by the Order on Third
Motion to Compel make clear that the trailer modified in March and April of 2005 was in
fact the modified trailer to which PC Crane referred in the Bank Disclosure -- "a custom
designed trailer that gives [PC Crane] the ability to use our 300 ton . . . crane as either a
300-ton crane or a 165-ton crane." Paul Belcher testified that the trailer referred to in the
Bank Disclosure would have to be modified so that it could carry more weight because
the counterweights used for a 300-ton crane are heavier than those used for a 165-ton
crane. [P. Belcher Depo.; R. 2337-38]. Dave Belcher testified that PC Crane has only
modified one trailer — a 1996 Fontaine trailer, which was modified through the addition
of a third axle and changing the axle spacing of the other two axles so that the trailer
could carry more weight. [D. Belcher Depo.; R. 2342-43]. Dave Belcher also testified
that the modified Fontaine trailer could be used to carry counterweights for both the 300ton and 165-ton cranes. [D. Belcher Depo.; R. 2342-43]. Vern Belcher testified that PC
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Crane has built only one custom designed trailer - the 1996 Fontaine step deck trailer,
which was purchased March 9, 2005 [V. Belcher Depo.; R. 2346-47] and that the
modifications added a third axle and changed axle spacing so that the trailer could carry
more weight [V. Belcher Depo.; R. 2347]. Vern Belcher testified that the modifications
to the Fontaine trailer were effected by PC Crane before April 8, 2005 — that is, the
modifications were effectuated between the purchase date of March 9 and April 8, 2005.
[V. Belcher Depo., R. 2348-49]. Stam testified that the modified Fontaine trailer could
haul counterweights for both the 165-ton and 300-ton cranes, and that the modified
Fontaine trailer was in fact used with counterweights for the 300-ton crane. [Stam Depo.;
R. 2355].

,

So, the facts are as follows:
(1)

Paul Belcher gave banking institutions the Bank Disclosure stating

that PC Crane had significantly increased its revenues through collaboration with
Stam in designing and building a custom designed trailer which allowed the use of
both a 165-ton and 300-ton crane configuration. That language makes absolutely
clear that PC Crane was stating that the modified trailer was in fact constructed
because PC Crane claimed that its construction allowed PC Crane to increase its
usage of the cranes.
(2)

PC Crane only built one custom modified trailer — the 1996 Fontaine

trailer that was modified between March and early April of 2005. That trailer was
modified so that it could carry more weight As Belchers and Stam testified, in
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order for a trailer to carry weights for the 165-ton or 300-ton cranes, a trailer
would have to carry more weight. The Fontaine was modified in exactly the way
that PC Crane testified a trailer would have to be modified to service both the 300ton and 165-ton cranes, and it was in fact used with both the 165 and 300-ton
cranes.
There is no doubt that the trailer that Paul Belcher stated in the Bank Disclosure was
modified in collaboration with Stam was in fact the trailer that was modified in March
and April, 2005.20
But PC Crane had a problem — PC Crane and PC Crane's counsel had been
representing to the District Court and McQueen that the subject modified trailer was built
in 2006 and was "irrelevant" because it was built after the "relevant period" ending
December 31, 2005. Because the only modified trailer was built squarely in the relevant
time period - February to early-April, 2005, PC Crane could not continue with its
deception. PC Crane then diametrically changed its representations to assert that Stam
and Belchers never modified any trailer - the one referred to in the Bank Disclosure did

20

PC Crane argued in connection with McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions
that this trailer was not the collaborated trailer (i.e., that PC Crane lied to its Bank in
saying that the collaborated trailer existed). It really doesn't matter. What does matter is
that PC Crane and its counsel repeatedly stated falsely that there were two trailers, one of
which was modified in 2006 - both lies. So long as PC Crane could preserve the false
argument that the modified trailer existed and was built in 2006, PC Crane could prevent
McQueen from telling the Jury that Stam and Belchers collaborated on a modified trailer
and the only modified trailer that existed was built in March, 2005.
23 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not exist. This new inconsistent position renders each objection to discovery baseless21
and each statement and suggestion to the Court and McQueen that there were two
modified trailers, that the collaborated trailer existed, and that it was modified in 2006
complete falsehoods. The course of events makes clear that this was not an innocent
mistake — it was a purposeful effort to prevent McQueen from discovering the damning
evidence that Stam and Belchers were collaborating and modifying a trailer between
February, 2005 and mid-April, 2005, when they swore they didn't even know each other.
Judge Reese heard the Second Motion for Sanctions after the trial.22 The Second
Motion for Sanctions sought the sanction of dismissal with prejudice because of the
conduct of plaintiffs and their counsel "in (i) misrepresenting material facts to the Court,
(ii) misrepresenting material facts to McQueen, (iii) disobeying this Court's discovery
order, and (iv) filing baseless objections to discovery requests." Judge Reese granted that
Motion after trial, but awarded McQueen as sanctions only the amount that McQueen
spent in pursuing the Second Motion for Sanctions — $7,475.00. That amount does not
remedy the multiple tens of thousands of dollars incurred by McQueen in attorney's fees
over an eight-month period as a direct result of PC Crane, Belchers, and their counsel's

2,

How could a discovery request about the collaborated trailer be "overly broad,
unduly burdensome, and irrelevant" if the answer were: "The trailer never existed"?
How could trailer information be "outside the scope of discovery authorized by the
Court" if no trailer was modified after December, 2005?
22

McQueen twice requested that Judge Dever hear this Motion before trial, but
Judge Dever would not entertain it.
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obstructionist and dishonest approach to this discovery process.
3.

McQueen's Request for an Award of Attorney's Fees Based Upon a Contract
PC Crane asserted that it gave McQueen two Goodwill Notes, each of which

provided for the recovery of attorney's fees. [Exs. 8, 11; Addendum at pp. 4 and 1]. Both
Goodwill Notes were secured by a Deed of Trust [Ex. 9 included in the Addendum at p.
9] which also provided for the recovery of McQueen's legal fees. McQueen filed a
Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses on November 3, 2008 [R. 3477]
seeking recovery of attorney's fees under the Goodwill Notes and Trust Deed. The
Guarantors executed a Guaranty, which guaranteed the payment of all amounts due under
the Goodwill Notes or any other obligation of PC Crane. [Ex. 59, Addendum p. 15].
McQueen filed a Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses Against Guarantors
on December 19, 2008 [R. 3842] seeking recovery of legal fees from the Guarantors.
Judge Reese entered an Order on Outstanding Motions on June 22, 2009 [R. 3933] which
denied both the Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses and the Motion for
Award of Attorney's Fees and Expenses Against Guarantors.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The District Court's Award of Sanctions Should be Augmented. The

District Court granted McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions, which was based on
defendants' and their counsel's pervasive efforts over an eight-month period to mislead
23

At the hearing of the Motion, McQueen's counsel requested that Judge Reese at a
minimum order PC Crane and its counsel to pay all legal fees that McQueen incurred as a
result of their misrepresentations and concealment concerning the subject trailer. [R.
4003; T. 76-77].
25
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the Court and counsel and to conceal damaging evidence and facts. The District Court
awarded as sanctions only $7,475.00 — the amount McQueen paid to present the Second
Motion for Sanctions. The sanctions award should be augmented at least by the expense
and attorney's fees McQueen incurred as a direct result of defendants' and their counsel's
misrepresentations and discovery abuse.
II.

McQueen Should Recover Its Attorney's Fees Incurred in Defending

Against PC Crane's Claims. PC Crane sued McQueen to escape liability under the
Goodwill Notes and to "rescind" the Notes. McQueen should be awarded all of its
attorney's fees below and on appeal because:
(A)

f

The elements of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 are present: (i) this

case is based on contract(s), (ii) the contract(s) allow at least one party to recover
attorney's fees, and (iii) PC Crane sought to recover its attorney's fees.
(B)

The Goodwill Notes allow recovery of attorney's fees in collection

actions. PC Crane's suit to recover Promissory Note payments and to be relieved of
future Note payments implicate the attorney's fee provision because (i) a suit to collect
and a defense of a suit to avoid payment are in substance the same and (ii) under Utah law
defense of an action to rescind a contract allowing for attorney's fees (which is what
defendants did here) gives rise to recovery of attorney's fees.
(C)

The Trust Deed here authorizes recovery of attorney's fees under the

exact circumstances presented here.
(D)

The Guaranty included a guarantee of PC Crane's liquidated or
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unliquidated, absolute or contingent obligations to McQueen and allowed attorney's fees
for its enforcement. McQueen's defense of PC Crane's effort to escape payment both for
PC Crane and the Guarantors implicated the Guaranty's provisions allowing recovery of
McQueen's legal fees.
ARGUMENT
L

THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF SANCTIONS SHOULD BE
AUGMENTED.

Judge Reese granted McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions but awarded
McQueen only $7,475.00 — the attorney's fees incurred by McQueen in presenting the
Second Motion for Sanctions. The standard of review on such an issue is abuse of
discretion. E.g., Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (UT 1997).
However, just like this Court, Judge Reese did not preside over PC Crane's discovery abuse — he
reviewed it on the record after Judge Dever disqualified himself. That circumstance should
lighten McQueen's burden of showing that Judge Reese's inadequate sanction should be
reversed.2"
This case is extraordinary. It presents a party's and a party's counsel's consistent
perversion of the legal process over a long period, including multiple material
misrepresentations to the Court and McQueen's counsel, all in an effort to hide facts,
documents, and their adverse consequences. The effect of that misbehavior was over

23

In an analogous context, when the facts are not disputed, appellate courts do not
give deference to the trial court's conclusions. E.g., State v. Seventy-Three Thousand
One Hundred Thirty Dollars, 2001 UT 67, 31 P.3d 514.
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eight months of expenses'and legal fees24 amounting to high multiple tens of thousands of
dollars and then the cost of successfully pursuing the sanctions motion. The gross
misbehavior presented here undermines the core of our system of justice.
A.

Our System of Justice Demands Honesty and Good Faith. Our

procedural rules are aimed at securing "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action." Rule 1(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The parties and their counsel
are charged with achieving that goal with candor and an overriding duty to the integrity of
the process. As concerns discovery, counsel are required to certify that the discovery
request, response, or objection is "not interposed for any improper purpose, such as . . . to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." A violation of that
Rule subjects a lawyer to a sanction, which may include "an order to pay the amount of
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation . . . ." Rule 26(g), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Lawyers practicing in our system of justice are officers of the Court — they are not
permitted to lie to the Court or opposing counsel, and they are not permitted to obstruct
the process. They are, indeed, the system participants who are charged with putting the
integrity of the system above their clients' individual interests. The Code of Professional
Conduct ("RPC") makes this clear. A lawyer may not controvert any issue "unless there
is a basis in law and fact for doing so." [Rule 3.1, RPC]. A lawyer must "make
24

This eight months of intense legal expense includes only the "trailer issue" — it
does not include the expenses of disproving the Belchers' false testimony about not
having spoken with Stam or their refusal to produce the Commission Agreement that they
all testified existed.
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reasonable efforts to expedite litigation." [Rule 3.2, RPC]. A lawyer may not knowingly
"make a false statement of facts . . . to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of
material fact. .. previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer." [Rule 3.3, RPC]. A
lawyer may not "obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy
or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value." [Rule 3.4,
RPC]. A lawyer may not "fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally
proper discovery request." [Rule 3.4(d), RPC]. Comment 2 to Rule 3.3 states that the
Rule "sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that
undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process." Lawyers must be required to abide
by these obligations if there is to be any hope that our judicial process will "secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." PC Crane's counsel
violated each and every one of these sacred duties over and over again. If lawyers and
parties are allowed to lie, obstruct, and hide evidence, the aspirations of our rules and
judicial system are a fantasy.
B.

What Happened Here. As set forth in detail in the Statement of Facts

above, PC Crane and its counsel, as the District Court found, over a long time and again
and again took a false position on the existence of a trailer on which Stam and Belchers
collaborated and modified. Their position changed only when the Court ordered
discovery that would reveal their prior series of lies. The evident purpose was to prevent
McQueen from being able to place before the Jury the facts that (i) PC Crane stated in
materials given to its lender that it had collaborated with Stam on modifying a trailer and
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(ii) the only trailer that was ever modified was modified in the February to April, 2005
time frame — when Belchers and Stam all testified they didn't know each other. Instead,
PC Crane and its counsel misled the Court and McQueen's counsel for eight months by
claiming that there was a modified trailer on which Stam and Belchers collaborated, and
that trailer was collaborated on and modified after December, 2005.
Without restating the detailed evidence, here is a summary of those positions and
their time line:
Prior to the filing of this lawsuit [The Subject Modified Trailer Exists], PC
Crane gave Bank of American Fork a document stating that PC Crane and Stam
"collaborated on . . . the building of a custom designed trailer that gives us the ability to
use our 300-ton hydraulic Liebherr crane as either a 300-ton crane or a 165-ton crane.
This is the primary reason for the drastic increase in the annual revenue production of this
machine." [Ex. 61, Addendum p. 20]. Thus, PC Crane told its bank that PC Crane and
Stam had in fact "collaborated on" the building of a "custom designed trailer" that was
"the primary reason for the drastic increase in the annual revenue production of this
machine." The modified trailer existed.
Early August 2007 to March 26, 2008. [The Subject Modified Trailer Existed,
But Was Built After 2005.] In response to McQueen's Third Set of Interrogatories and
Request for Production seeking information about who participated in construction of the
trailer, the date the trailer was constructed, and documents bearing on those issues, PC
Crane stated in their response dated August 7, 2007 that the discovery requests were

30J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"overly broad, unduly burdensome [and] . . . not relevant." [R. 947].
McQueen moved to compel. PC Crane's counsel's ploy to assert that there was a
modified trailer but it existed after the "relevant period" was brazen. In PC Crane's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Second Motion to Compel, PC Crane argued
that McQueen had identified the relevant period of time to be prior to March, 2005.2^
[R. 996-98]. PC Crane went on to state, "McQueen specifically identifies this period of
time as the 'relevant time period' for this action" and that "[e]ven though Plaintiffs
believe the records concerning the subject trailer are not relevant to the issues in this case,
they are willing to respond to the Discovery Requests if limited to the relevant time
*

period of October, 2004 to March, 2005." [R. 997-98]. They then argued that McQueen
was being unreasonable in refusing to limit the time frame of discovery requests and
argued that the Court should limit McQueen's discovery to the relevant time period and
deny the Second Motion to Compel. [R. 998]. PC Crane thus conceded the existence of
"the subject trailer," but asked the Court to not require them to produce information about
it if it was "outside the relevant time period."
At the hearing of the Motion to Compel, PC Crane's counsel told the Court, with
respect to the collaborated trailer, "This trailer, Your Honor, as we certified in a letter,
this collaboration occurred much after the purchase of the fourth crane in April of 2005.
It was well into the year 2006." He further stated, "The trailer wasn't even conceived of
until the year 2006 between Stam and the Belchers. At that time, a year and a half after
25

This mischaracterizes McQueen's position as to the date - the transaction closed
in April, 2005.
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they purchased the first cranes, there clearly is no relevance to their collaboration on this
trailer." [R. 4001, T. 50-52].
On November 2, 2007, the Court entered an Order which required production of
all documents relating to the trailer prior to December, 2005 [Order on Motion to Quash
and Motions to Compel, Paragraph 2(e); R. 1096]. In response, PC Crane's counsel
communicated that Belchers "have no responsive documents." [R. 2301]. McQueen then
sent its Fourth Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production requesting that PC Crane
identify all trailers it owned of the kind that was modified. PC Crane objected on the
grounds that the request was "overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks information
that is not relevant."26 [R. 1555]. It also objected on the ground that it sought
information "outside of the scope of discovery authorized by the Court." Naturally, if
there were no trailer modified after the Court's cutoff date of December, 2005, this
objection would have made no sense and would have been improperly asserted.
McQueen's counsel then wrote PC Crane's counsel advising that McQueen had
independently verified the existence of a trailer modified prior to December, 2005 and
stated:
We intend to seek sanctions if the documents relating to this trailer
. . . are not immediately forthcoming. When we do, and when this
matter plays out, we do not want you or your client to be able to say
that there was some innocent mistake made. You and your client are
on notice that the trailer in question was made and titled during the
time period for which production was ordered by the Court. If these
26

What could be more relevant than the fact that PC Crane modified only one such
trailer? How burdensome can it be to state: "PC Crane owned only one drop-deck trailer
— the Fontaine"?
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documents are not produced now, in response to this very pointed
request, it will be clear that they have been intentionally withheld.
[R. 2309].
PC Crane's counsel responded that PC Crane had "no documents relating to the
manufacture of the 'custom designed trailer' prior to December, 2005." [R. 2512].
McQueen then filed its Third Motion to Compel on December 13, 2007 seeking
production of the withheld information. PC Crane stated that it objected because the
request "sought information outside the scope of discovery authorized by the Court" [that
is, after December 31, 2005] and indignantly stated that McQueen's effort to determine
whether PC Crane was "intentionally withholding documents with respect to the trailer"
was "unsubstantiated" and improper. [R. 1633-34]. At the hearing of that Motion, PC
Crane's counsel told the Court that PC Crane and Stam did collaborate on a trailer but
"there just aren't any documents." He stated that the trailer referred to in the Bank
Disclosure (i.e., the trailer on which Stam and Belchers collaborated) was for a different
crane. [R. 4002; T. 38-39].
Finally, the District Court in its Order on Third Motion to Compel dated March 20,
2008 required PC Crane to supply all documents reflecting work done to modify any drop
deck trailers owned by PC Crane prior to December 31, 2005 and to allow McQueen to
depose PC Crane's principals on the subject of work done to modify any drop deck
trailer. [R. 2081].
March 26, 2008 to Present. [There was Never a Subject Modified Trailer].
Now being forced to produce information by deposition and document requests
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concerning modification of any drop deck trailer, PC Crane's counsel reversed their many
statements over the past eight months — instead of continuing to represent and certify that
the "subject trailer" had been built long after December, 2005, PC Crane now took the
position that "the trailer . . . was never actually built." [R. 2334]. The Bank Disclosure
stated that the subject modified trailer gave PC Crane "the ability to use our 300 ton . . .
crane as either a 300 ton crane or a 165 ton crane." [Ex. 61. See p. 20 in Addendum].
The second-round depositions of Stam and Belchers demonstrated that, as outlined in
greater detail above, PC Crane modified only one trailer, which was modified through the
addition of a third axle and changing the axle spacing of the other axle so that the trailer
could carry more weight. [D. Belcher Depo., R. 2342]. The modifications to this trailer
were effectuated between March 9 and April 8, 2005 (the second crane transaction closed
later in April, 2005). [V. Belcher Depo., R. 2348-49]. Stam testified that the modified
trailer could haul counterweights for both the 165-ton and 300-ton cranes and that the
modified trailer was in fact used with counterweights for both cranes. [Stam Depo.,
R. 2355].

0

Following, in black and white, are some of PC Crane and its counsel's statements
over an 8-month period, which cannot be squared with their present position that there
was never any trailer modified in collaboration with Stam. It will dispel any concern that
PC Crane and its counsel did not over a long period intentionally mislead and
misrepresent to evade discovery.
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Observations

PC Crane's Statements
"One of the operational decisions that we
[PC Crane] and Lon [Stam] collaborated on
was in the building of a custom designed
trailer that gives us the ability to use our
300-ton hydraulic Liebherr crane as either a
300-ton crane or a 165-ton crane. This is
the primary reason for the drastic increase
in the annual revenue production of this
machine." [Bank Disclosure, Ex. 61,
Addendum at pp. 20].

Obviously, if the "custom designed
trailer" was "the primary reason" for a
drastic increase in revenue, the trailer
existed. Now PC Crane says it never
existed.

In response to McQueen's discovery
requesting information concerning dates of
construction of the subject trailer and who
participated in its modification, PC Crane
on August 7, 2007 objected stating that the
request was "overly broad, unduly
burdensome, and irrelevant." [R. 2273-75].

If there was no such trailer, PC Crane
would have said so and candor
required that it do so if it were true. If
there was in fact no such trailer,
responding to the request would
obviously not be "unduly burdensome"
and certainly not irrelevant. PC
Crane's counsel, when they signed the
response containing those false
objections, certified that they were
warranted. Rule 26(g), U.R.C.P.

In response to Maak's request for
production of information concerning the
subject trailer, Burghardt stated on August
13, 2007: "During the relevant time period,
PC Crane and Mr. Stam had no
communications or interaction concerning
the subject trailer." [R. 2281].

Burghardt's communication clearly
assumes the existence of the subject
trailer — it would have made no sense
to say what he did if there were no
such "subject trailer." This is
particularly so given that PC Crane's
counsel told the Court that there was
"collaboration" on modifying the
subject trailer. [See paragraphs 5, 6, 7,
9, and 10 below.]

In its response to McQueen's Motion to
Compel filed August 30, 2007, PC Crane
stated: "Even though plaintiffs believe the
records concerning the subject trailer are
not relevant to the issues in this case . . . ."
[R. 2293].

Clearly, PC Crane's statement that the
records concerning the subject trailer
are not relevant is inconsistent with the
non-existence of the subject trailer.
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Burghardt stated to the District Court on
September 5, 2007: 'This trailer. Your
Honor, as we certified in a letter, this
collaboration occurred much after the
purchase of the fourth crane in April of
2005. It was well into the year 2006. * * *
"The trailer wasn't even conceived of until
the year 2006
" Later, he stated, "At
that time, a year and a half after they
purchased the first cranes, there is clearly no
relevance to their collaboration on this
trailer." [R. 4001, T. 50-52].

Burghardt's statement that "this
trailer" occurred after April of 2005 —
well into 2006 — and that there was
collaboration on "this trailer" cannot
be squared with his present claim that
such a trailer never existed.

In his letter dated December 10, 2007,
Burghardt told Maak, in response to Maak's
request for production of documents
relating to the trailer, the following:
"Documents showing when the original
unmodified trailer was created have
absolutely no relevance to this inquiry. The
original trailer was apparently manufactured
well before PC Crane was created and well
before PC Crane began dealing with your
client or ever met Lon Stam. We believe
that the Court's Order addresses the
manufacture of the customized trailer and
not the manufacture of the original
unmodified trailer." [R. 2312-13],

Burghardt's refusal to produce
documents relating to the "original
unmodified trailer" because the
Court's Order was limited to the
customizing of this trailer plainly
suggests that there was such a trailer
that was customized. Why didn't he
say that there was no such trailer?
Because PC Crane wanted to tell the
Jury that the subject trailer was
modified in collaboration with Stam in
2006.

At the hearing on March 4, 2008, the focus
of attention was whether the trailer
modified in March 2005 was the Stamcollaborated trailer or whether the one
modified after December 31, 2005 was the
Stam-collaborated trailer. The District
Court asked Barneck how McQueen was to
know which trailer was the subject
customized trailer. [R. 4002, T. 53].
Barneck suggested that McQueen's efforts
in this regard was "a witch hunt" based on
"unfounded suspicions that we have been

How can a lawyer in a very extended
hearing address again and again the
Court's and counsel's concerns about
which trailer is the one modified with
Stam [the one modified in March 2005
or the one PC Crane then claimed was
modified in 2006] and NEVER SAY
THAT HIS CLIENT ASSERTED
THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH
TRAILER? How can a lawyer tell the
Court that "with respect to these
trailers," was the Court asking PC
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hiding or destroying documents or lying."
[Id.] After significant discussion, the
District Court stated: "It appears to me that
the plaintiffs should produce copies of the
information concerning the modification of
whatever trailer was done to establish
whether or not it was the same trailer that's
at issue . . . ." [R. 4002; T. 66]. Maak
explained that the problem was that PC
Crane claimed that the subject trailer was
different from the one modified in midApril 2005, and McQueen needed to know
what trailer PC Crane claimed was the one
modified with Stam. [R. 4002; T. 72-75].
Barneck stated: "But with respect to these
trailers. Judge, we can certainly — I
understood what the Court intended from
the ruling, and this is almost a question by
way of clarification was to produce records
relating to any trailers from March to December
of '05 so it can be shown whether or not those
are the one that was referenced in [the Bank
Disclosure!." [R. 4002; T. 75].

Crane to produce records concerning the
March to December 2005 trailer "so it can
be shown whether or not those are the one
that was referenced in the Bank
Disclosure." HOW CAN BARNECK
CONTINUE TALKING ABOUT MORE
THAN ONE CUSTOMIZED TRAILER
WHEN HE KNEW THERE WAS
ONLY ONE? Is this candor to the
Court and counsel?

In response to McQueen's Third Motion to
Compel seeking documents relating to any
trailer modified by PC Crane, PC Crane on
January 4, 2005 stated that it objected to the
request "because it sought information
outside the scope of discovery authorized by
the Court" - i.e., after December, 2005.
[R. 1633-34, «|ffl 37-38].

How can a request for information on
a modified trailer relate to a period
after the date the Court allowed
(December, 2005) if no trailer was
modified after December, 2005?

Barneck stated to the Court on March 4,
2008 that PC Crane did collaborate on a
trailer with Stam, but then explained that the
trailer on which they collaborated was for a
different crane than the one referred to in
P C Crane's document described in
paragraph 1: He stated: "PC Crane wanted
a drop-deck trailer like this, they wanted to
create one. This was for a different crane.

How can Barneck truthfully state that
the "other one" [trailer] that Maak is
complaining about "from the loan
documents" [the subject trailer] was
for the 300-ton crane if there was no
such trailer?
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It was for the 165 Liebherr. The other one
that Counsel's complaining about from the
loan documents was for the 300. Different
crane." [R. 4002; T. 39].
10.

PC Crane's counsel told the District Court
that there were two modified trailers — one
modified in March, 2005 and the other
"custom designed trailer." [R. 2427-28,

Now they say that there was only one
modified trailer — that the other one
never existed. One or the other
statement is necessarily false.

TIT 30, 36].

So, for 8 months, PC Crane and its counsel resisted producing documents relating
to the modified trailer again and again claiming that it was irrelevant because the subject
Stam-collaborated modification occurred after December 31, 2005 and never stated, as
they now do, the absolutely inconsistent position that no such trailer ever existed. After
the Court required PC Crane to produce documents that would demonstrate that they had
been misrepresenting all along as indicated above, Burghardt wrote Maak a letter stating
that: "The trailer mentioned in those documents [the document identified in Paragraph 1
above] was never actually built." Either PC Crane and its counsel were untruthful in the
above 10 examples or they are untruthful now. There is no other possibility.
The foregoing course of events establishes, in black and white, that PC Crane and
its counsel repeatedly misrepresented to the Court and counsel that there was a trailer on
which Stam and Belchers collaborated, which was in fact built and modified long after
December, 2005. They did this so as to prevent McQueen from arguing at trial that the
only trailer that was modified was modified before the second crane transaction and that,
therefore, this was the trailer referred to in the Bank of American Fork documents on
which Belchers and Stam collaborated prior to the second crane transaction — and that,
38
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therefore, Stam and Belchers did not testify truthfully when they stated that they did not
know each other during this time period. The duration, multiplicity of lies, and
circumstances leave no room to claim that this was an honest mistake. It was plainly
purposeful deception.
C.

What is the Appropriate Sanction? It has been demonstrated through

incontestible documents and transcripts that PC Crane and its counsel over an 8-month
period obstructed discovery and lied about the trailer on which Stam and Belchers
collaborated. Why did they do this? Because if they admitted either (i) that the trailer that
was in fact modified and customized was one on which they collaborated or (ii) that the
trailer that was modified and customized was the only trailer that was modified and
customized, they would establish a fact that would destroy their case — the fact that
Belchers were involved with Stam in their business before the second crane transaction
and, therefore, their claims and sworn testimony that they didn't know Stam or of his role
in the business prior to the second transaction were all false. PC Crane and its counsel
made a conscious decision to attempt to preserve the baseless, false position that there was
another modified trailer which was modified long after December, 2005, which was the
one referred to in the documents given to Bank of American Fork. This fact is undeniably
and now admittedly a lie. It was obviously perpetrated to gain strategic advantage and to
keep this critical, damning evidence from McQueen. In doing so, PC Crane and its
counsel violated the solemn duties of lawyers under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
Code of Professional Responsibility to allow cases to be decided on the evidence and on
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their merits rather than based upon concealment and contrived falsehoods. What is the
appropriate sanction for such behavior? If the sanction is limited to the cost of making the
Motion for Sanctions only, there is no significant disadvantage to engaging in such
behavior. If you're caught, you lose a few thousand dollars in legal fees; if you're not
caught, then you win by your deceptive gamesmanship.
McQueen asked the District Court before trial to dismiss PC Crane's case with
prejudice for these abuses. Judge Reese heard the motion after trial and awarded only
McQueen's sanction motion costs. McQueen asked Judge Reese at a minimum order PC
Crane and its counsel to pay all legal fees that McQueen incurred as a result of their
misrepresentations and concealment concerning the subject trailer. [R. 4003; T. 76-77].
Under the Court's sanction award, McQueen was uncompensated for about 8 months of
intense lawyering involving multiple supplemental sets of interrogatories and requests for
production, two Motions to Compel and briefing and arguing same, four supplemental
depositions, extensive correspondence, hiring private investigators, etc. The resultant fees
and expenses dwarf the 7,000-odd dollar cost of that Motion for Sanctions. Under the
sanction imposed by the District Court, McQueen must bear all of those expenses, which
were caused by the palpably wrongful, dishonest behavior of PC Crane. It bears
reemphasis that because of the disqualification of Judge Dever, Judge Reese did not
preside over the abuse that he found in granting the Second Motion for Sanctions. He, like
this Court, was required to decide the Motion on the record. That fact should lighten
McQueen's burden to show that the minimal sanction imposed by Judge Reese was an
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abuse of discretion.
Research has not disclosed any case of discovery abuse remotely approaching this
shocking case. Utah appellate decisions hold that a party's conduct merits sanctions if any
of the following circumstances are found: (i) The party's misbehavior was wilful, (ii) a
party acted in bad faith, (iii) a court can attribute some fault to the party, or (iv) the party
has engaged in persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process. Morton
v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271 (UT 1997). Here, each and every element set
forth in Morton is present in spades. The ultimate sanction of dismissal has been
repeatedly approved for behavior dramatically less culpable and harmful to the system
than that presented here. Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App. 127, 981 P.2d 407, cert, denied,
984 P.2d 1023 (UT 1999) [finding that a party had wilfully obstructed discovery supported
the court's decision to impose default as a discovery sanction]; Schoney v. Memorial
Estates, Inc., 790 P.2D 584, cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232; W. W. and W.B. Gardner v. Park
West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (UT 1977) [default appropriate where there was
frustration of the legal process].
Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes the Court on sanctions to "take such action in regard to the
failure as are just." These authorized sanctions include awarding "the reasonable
attorney's fees, caused by the failure." Rule 37(b)(2)(D). These Rules suggest that the
sanction be fair ("just") and that the expense suffered by the opposing party should be
compensated absent some countervailing justification for the misbehavior. How can it be
fair or "just" for McQueen to bear the enormous burden of eight months of lawyering that
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was directly caused by defendants' gross misbehavior? McQueen respectfully submits that
any sanction that leaves McQueen uncompensated for at least the direct economic damage
that was inflicted by PC Crane and its counsel's bad faith, dishonest behavior is an abuse
of discretion. In addition, this Court should direct the District Court to impose an
additional sanction amount upon defendants and/or their counsel to deter like conduct in
the future. Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508 (UT App. 1996) (discovery sanctions are
intended to deter misconduct).
ii.

MCQUEEN SHOULD RECOVER ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES
INCURRED IN DEFENDING AGAINST PC CRANE'S CLAIMS.

McQueen seeks to recover attorney's fees from PC Crane and the Guarantors based
upon (A) Utah Code Ann., § 78B-5-826, (B) the Goodwill Notes, (C) the Trust Deed, and
(D) the Guaranty.
A.

McQueen is Entitled to Recover Attorney's Fees Under Section

78B-5-826.
Utah Code Ann., § 78B-5-826 providesas follows:
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the
provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing
allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees.
This Court in Hooban v. Unicity International Inc., 2009 UT App. 287, held that
for this provision to be applicable, only the following must be established: "[F]irst, the
underlying litigation must be based on a contract; and second, the contract must allow at
least one party to recover attorney fees." Id. at <|j 9. This Court stated: "The statute does
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not require that the contract or its provisions actually be enforceable under the theory
advanced in the lawsuit, (citation omitted). Instead, 'the language of the statute focuses
on the provisions of the writing rather than its legal effect' and 'requires only that a party
to the litigation assert the [contract's] enforceability as a basis for recovery'." Id.
Here, McQueen prevailed on all accounts, and both elements are established — as to
the first, the Goodwill Notes, Trust Deed, and Guaranty each "allow at least one party to
recover attorney's fees."27 As to the second, PC Crane in the prayer of its Complaint
sought recovery of attorney's fees from McQueen.28 The statute is therefore applicable
and this Court should remand the case to the District Court for a determination of the
amount of McQueen attorney's fees.
B.

McQueen is Entitled to Recover Legal Fees Under the Goodwill Notes.

PC Crane asserts that the Goodwill Notes were the $228,000 Note and the $177,600
Note.29 The $228,000.00 Goodwill Note at Paragraph 2 provides as follows:
2.
Default. Time is of the essence of this Promissory
Note. A default shall occur under this Promissory Note if:
2.1
Failure to Make Payments. Maker [PC Crane]
fails to make any payment under this Promissory Note on the due date
of such payment.
Paragraph 3, "Remedies," provides that "[i]n the event of a default under this Promissory

27

The precise provisions in each document are addressed below.

28

See paragraph 4 of prayer of Complaint. [R. 25].

29

Paragraph 5 of PC Crane's Statement of Facts (PC Crane Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees [R. 3563-64]).
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Note, McQueen may take any of the following actions, which includes an action to collect
the Notes and recover all costs and reasonable attorney's fees in connection therewith."
[Ex. 11; Addendum at p. 1]. The $177,600.00 Goodwill Note [Ex. 8, Addendum at p. 4]
has the same provisions.
Thus, both Goodwill Notes provide that in the event of default, an action can be
filed to collect the Notes and recover all costs and reasonable attorney's fees. PC Crane
argued below that the Notes' provisions were inapplicable because (i) PC Crane never
failed to make a payment (and that its suing to recover payments already made was not
equivalent to failing to make a payment), and (ii) that McQueen never filed an action to
collect the Goodwill Notes (and that McQueen's defense against PC Crane's action to
avoid liability under the Goodwill Notes did not constitute such an action). Neither
argument has merit.
With respect to the first, the Court should not frustrate the parties' evident intent by
interpreting the provision here to allow PC Crane to avoid its liability for legal fees by
making payments under the Goodwill Notes and concurrently suing to recover them and to
be relieved of making future payments.30 As to the second, whether PC Crane sues to
avoid liability or McQueen sues to enforce liability does not change the substance of the
case — only the alignment of the parties differs. Similarly, there is no difference in
30

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that parties not
purposely do anything which will injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the
contract. E.g., Bastian v. Cedar Hills Inv. & Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 821 (UT 1981).
Suing to escape exactly what the Goodwill Notes required is, plainly, a breach of that
covenant, and the attorney's fee provisions should not be narrowly interpreted to reward
PC Crane for breaching that covenant.
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substance between a refusal to make a payment and the making of a payment and suing for
its recovery — both require litigation to collect. PC Crane, which itself asserted the right to
recover its own attorney's fees based upon the parties' agreements, should not be allowed
to wiggle out of its own responsibility through a hypertechnical interpretation contrived
after it lost.
Moreover, Utah law is clear that if a contract allows recovery of legal fees in a suit
to enforce a contract, fees are also recoverable when a party defends against a suit to avoid
enforcement of that contract. Deja Vue, Inc. v. United States Energy Corp., 1999 UT App.
355, 993 P.2d 222. That is precisely what happened here. In Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT
App. 404, 38 P.3d 1001, plaintiff sued to rescind a contract allowing recovery of
attorney's fees in "litigation to enforce" the contract. The trial court awarded the fees to
the defendant. On appeal, plaintiff argued the defendant's defense was not a claim to
enforce the contract as the fee provision required, but rather a defense to a rescission
claim, which literally was true. Plaintiff there, like PC Crane, also argued that there was
no default under the contract because it was fully performed. The Utah Court of Appeals
affirmed the fee award, reasoning that when the plaintiff "sued to rescind the [c]ontract,
the ensuing defense was Mitigation to enforce' the [c]ontract." Id. at \ 17. Accordingly,
"[b]ecause [the defendants] were successful in their defense of the [c]ontract, [the court]
upheld the award of costs and attorney's fees." Id. The court rejected the claim that there
was no liability for fees because the contract was fully performed, noting: "Chase cites no
legal authority for the proposition, and we find it unconvincing." 2001 UT App. 404, ^ 13,
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n. 2. Here, just like in Chase, PC Crane sued to "rescind" and recover all payments under
the Goodwill Notes [Complaint, Prayer; R. 24-25, Iffl 1, 2, 3], which allow recovery of fees
for "collection and enforcement of the Promissory Note(s)" and claimed that it had folly
performed by making all Note payments. McQueen successfully defended with the result
being that the contract and Notes were not rescinded and McQueen was entitled to keep
the payments PC Crane made under the Goodwill Notes.
These parties both contemplated that if there were litigation about the Goodwill
Notes, the prevailing party would recover its attorney's fees. Indeed, PC Crane's own
prayer for relief seeks recovery of those very attorney's fees had it prevailed. Now having
lost, PC Crane argues that there was never a right to attorney's fees at all. If, as PC Crane
alleged in its Complaint, it was entitled to recover its legal fees from McQueen if it won,
then it follows that McQueen is entitled to recover its attorney's fees when PC Crane lost.
C.

The Trust Deed Mandates Recovery of Legal Expenses.

The Trust Deed was given to secure all amounts owed under the Notes, the payment
and performance of each agreement of Lacy under the Trust Deed, and the payments of all
sums expended by McQueen pursuant to Paragraphs 2(d), (e), and (f) of the Trust Deed.
[Ex. 9; Addendum at p. 9]. The Trust Deed further provides in Paragraph 4 that McQueen
may "commence, appear and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the
security hereof or the rights or powers of [McQueen] and in exercising any such powers,
incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem
necessary therefor, including costs of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay counsel's
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reasonable fees." Under each of the following two independent bases, McQueen is
entitled to recover its attorney's fees under the Trust Deed:
First, the Trust Deed secures payment of all amounts owed under the two Goodwill
Notes. Paragraph 4 provides that McQueen may, among other things, "defend any action
or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of
[McQueen] . . . ." By suing McQueen in this case to extinguish the debt secured by the
Trust Deed, that provision was implicated and McQueen was entitled to defend this action,
which "affect[ed] the security [of the Trust Deed] or the rights . . . of [McQueen]."
Second, PC Crane in this action moved the Court to force McQueen to reconvey the
Trust Deed in this case [R. 2165]. McQueen expended significant effort, albeit
unsuccessfully,31 to avoid being forced to reconvey the Trust Deed.32 PC Crane's motion
to force McQueen to reconvey its Trust Deed unquestionably constituted "any action or
proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of [McQueen]."
Under both circumstances, McQueen was entitled, under Paragraph 4 of the Trust Deed, to
"expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor,
including costs of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay counsel's reasonable fees."
Those amounts are owed under the Trust Deed.

3

'The Trust Deed provides for the recovery of attorney's fees by McQueen
irrespective of whether the effort was successful.
32

For example, McQueen filed a memorandum opposing PC Crane's motion [R.
2198] and filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court [R. 2786].
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D.

Liability of Guarantors.

The Guarantors executed a Guaranty [Ex. 59; Addendum at p. 15], which
guaranteed "the prompt and full payment of all sums now or hereinafter due pursuant to
said Notes or otherwise due any of the Creditors [McQueen] by Borrower [PC Crane]
pursuant to the Notes and any other debt or obligation of Borrower, notwithstanding
whether said debt is primary or secondary, or whether said debt is liquidated or
unliquidated, absolute or contingent." Thus, to the extent that there is liability for
attorney's fees under the Notes and/or Trust Deed, there is also liability under the
Guaranty. In addition, the Guaranty's language quoted above is broader than the
provisions of the Goodwill Notes. The Guaranty's covenant that the Guarantors would
promptly and fully pay (not sue to be relieved of payment)33 all sums now or hereafter due
. . . whether absolute or contingent" is clearly violated by the Guarantors' suit to recover
past and escape liability for future payments. McQueen's defense sought recovery of all
amounts under the Goodwill Notes, which constituted either or all of (i) a payment under
the Notes, or (ii) a debt or obligation of PC Crane whether "primary or secondary,"
"liquidated or unliquidated, absolute or contingent." The Guaranty provides for recovery
of "all reasonable attorney's fees and costs necessary for the enforcement of this
Guaranty." This attorney's fee provision is applicable to McQueen's effort to seek
enforcement of the Guaranty. Under the Guaranty, therefore, the Court should find that
the Guarantors are liable for an award of all attorney's fees incurred by McQueen in this
33

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies as well to the Guaranty. See
note 30, supra.
48
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case.
CONCLUSION
McQueen requests the following relief on appeal:
1.

As to the Sanctions, that this Court rule that plaintiffs and their counsel are

liable to McQueen as sanctions in the amount of all costs, expenses and attorney's fees
incurred by McQueen as a result of plaintiffs' misrepresentations and discovery abuse
concerning the trailer including that aspect of this appeal and an appropriate additional
amount to deter similar future behavior, and remand to the District Court for a
determination of the amount thereof.
2.

As to PC Crane's liability for attorney's fees, that this Court rule that PC

Crane is liable to McQueen for all costs, expenses and attorney's fees incurred by
McQueen in this action including appeal, and remand to the District Court for a
determination of the amount thereof.
3.

As to the Guarantors' liability for attorney's fees, that this Court rule that

David Paul Belcher, Vernon Belcher, and Lacy LLC are jointly and severally liable to
McQueen for all costs, expenses and attorney's fees incurred by McQueen in this action
including appeal, and remand to the District Court for a determination of the amount
thereof.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of March, 2010.

Maak, Of Counsel
BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was served
this

IO

day of March, 2010 by mailing on said date two copies thereof by United

States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to:
Matthew C. Barneck, Esq.
Paul P. Burghardt, Esq.
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
299 South Main Street, Suite 1500
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465
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PROMISSORY NOTE
$228,800.00

Salt Lake City, Utah
October 18,2004

{

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, PC CRANE SERVICE LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY, a Utah limited liability company (referred to herein as "Maker"),
promises to pay to the order of MCQUEEN CRANE SERVICES, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company, Central Equipment, LC, a Utah limited liability company, and McQueen
Masonry, Inc., a Utah corporation (collectively "Holders"), at such place within the United
States as Holders may designate from time to time, at the time and in the manner hereinafter
stipulated, the principal sum of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($228,800.00) (the "Original Principal Amount")
plus interest as provided herein.
I.

Interest and Payment.

1.1. Interest Rate. Amounts owed under this Promissory Note (the "Loan")
shall bear interest at the rate often percent (10%) per annum, compounded annually.
1.2.
Payment. Maker shall repay the principal and interest owing under this
Promissory Note as follows: Maker shall make thirty-six (36) equal and consecutive monthly
payments of $4,391.32 each to Holders beginning on October 30, 2004, and continuing on the
same day of each following month, through and including September 30, 2007. On October
30, 2007 (the "Maturity Date"), Maker shall make a single lump sum payment to Holders of
the entire remaining balance of the Original Principal Amount plus accrued interest
($123,389.74). Payments made hereunder shall be made in lawful money of the United States
of America.
1.3. Prepayment. Maker shall be permitted to prepay all or any portion of
the amounts owing under this Promissory Note prior to the Maturity Date without penalty and
without the prior written consent of the Holders.
1.4.
Place and Time of Payment. All payments specified herein shall be
deemed made when actually received by Holders.
2.
Default. Time is of the essence of this Promissory Note. A default shall occur
under this Promissory Note if:
2.1.
Failure to Make Payments. Maker fails to make any payment under this
Promissory Note on the date due of such payment.
2.2.
Bankruptcy. Maker, or any of the individuals referred to herein as
Maker, becomes insolvent, a receiver is appointed to take possession of all or a substantial
part of Maker's properties, Maker makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors or files a
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voluntary petition in bankruptcy or Maker is the subject of an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy that is not dismissed within 60 days.
2.3.
Note. A payment default occurs under that certain other promissory
note of Maker, in favor of Central Equipment, LC, a Utah limited liability company and
McQueen Masonry, Inc., a Utah corporation, dated the same day as this Promissory Note, in
the original principal amount of $139,450.00; that goes uncorrected after 15 days written
notice of the default;
2.4.
Deed of Trust. A default in that deed of trust granted by Maker in
favor of Holders to secure the payment of this Promissory Note;
2.5.
Security Agreement. A default in that security agreement granted b y
Maker in favor of Holders to secure payment of this Promissory Note
3.
Remedies. In the event of a default under this Promissory Note, Holders, at
their option, may take any one or more of the following actions:
3.1.
Acceleration and Legal Action. Declare the entire unpaid principal
balance of the debt evidenced hereby, and all interest on such debt and all other costs and
expenses evidenced hereby, to be immediately due and payable, notwithstanding any other
provision hereof, and commence legal action for collection and enforcement o f the Promissory
Note, including all costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred in connection therewith.
3.2.
Other Remedies. Pursue any other right or remedy provided herein or
otherwise allowed by law. Holders may pursue any such rights or remedies singly, together or
successively. Exercise of any such right or remedy shall not be deemed an election of
remedies. Failure to exercise any right or remedy shall not be deemed a waiver of any
existing or subsequent default nor a waiver of any such right or remedy.
4.

Governing Law, Severability.

4.1.
Governing Law. This Promissory Note has been executed under and
shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
4.2.
Severability. If any provision of this Promissory Note is found by a
court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable as written, then the parties
intend and desire that (a) such provision shall be enforceable to the M l extent permitted by
law and (b) the invalidity or unenforceability of such provision shall not affect the validity and
enforceability of the remainder of this Promissory Note.
5,
Amendment. This Promissory Note may not be amended, modified or
changed, nor shall any provision hereof be deemed waived, except only by an instrument in
writing signed by the party against whom enforcement of any such waiver, amendment,
change or modification is sought.
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6.
Binding Agreement.
successors and assigns of Maker.

This Promissory Note shall be binding upon the

7.
• Security. The payment of this Promissory Note is secured by a deed of trust
and a security agreement, each dated the same date as this Promissory Note.
This Promissory Note is intended to be effective as of the date and year first above
written.

PC
CRANE
SERVICE
LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY, a Utah limited
liability company

Titlery
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PROMISSORY NOTE

$177,600.00

Salt Lake City, Utah
March21,2005

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, PC C R A N E SERVICE LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY, a Utah limited liability company (referred to herein as "Maker"),
promises to pay to the order of McQueen Masonry, a Utah corporation ("Holder"), at such
place within the United States as Holder may designate from time to time, at the time and in
the manner hereinafter stipulated, the principal sum of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($177,600.00) (the "Original
Principal Amount") plus interest as provided herein.
L

Interest and Payment.

1.1.
Interest Rate. Amounts owed under this Promissory Note (the "Loan")
shall bear interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum.
1.2.
Payment. Maker shall repay the principal and interest owing under this
Promissory Note as follows: Maker shall make thirty-five (35) equal and consecutive monthly
payments of Two Thousand One Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars and 46/100 ($2,122.46) each
to Holder beginning on May 1, 2005 and continuing on the same day of each following
month, through and including March 1, 2008. On April 1, 2008, Maker shall make a single
lump sum payment to Holder of the entire remaining balance of the Original Principal
Amount plus accrued interest ($152,879.31). Such payment shall be in lawful money of the
United States of America and when received by Holder shall constitute full and final payment
of all amounts owed hereunder.
1.3.
Prepayment. Maker shall be permitted to prepay all or any portion of
the amounts owing under this Promissory Note prior to the Maturity Date without penalty and
without the prior written consent of the Holder.
1.4.
Place and Time of Payment. All payments specified herein shall be
deemed made when actually received by Holder.
2.
Default. Time is of the essence of this Promissory Note. A default shall occur
under this Promissory Note if:
2.1.
Failure to Make Payments. Maker fails to make any payment under this
Promissory Note on the date due of such payment.
2.2.
Bankruptcy. Maker, or any of the individuals referred to herein as
Maker, becomes insolvent, a receiver is appointed to take possession of all or a substantial
part of Maker's properties, Maker makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors or files a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy or Maker is the subject of an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy that is not dismissed within 60 days.
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2.3.
Notes. A payment default occurs under any other promissory note of
Maker, in favor of either or both Central Equipment, LC, a Utah limited liability company,
and/or McQueen Masonry, Inc., a Utah corporation, that goes uncorrected after 15 days prior
written notice of default:
2.4.
Deed of Trust. A default in that deed of trust granted by Maker in
favor of Holder to secure the payment of this Promissory Note;
2.5.
Security Agreement. A default in that security agreement granted by
Maker in favor of Holder to secure payment of this Promissory Note
3.
Remedies. In the event of a default under this Promissory Note, Holder, at its
option, may take any one or more of the following actions:
3.1.
Acceleration and Legal Action. Declare the entire unpaid principal
balance of the debt evidenced hereby, and all interest on such debt and all other costs and
expenses evidenced hereby, to be immediately due and payable, notwithstanding any other
provision hereof, and commence legal action for collection and enforcement of the Promissory
Note, including all costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred in connection therewith.
3.2.
Other Remedies. Pursue any other right or remedy provided herein or
otherwise allowed by law. Holder may pursue any such rights or remedies singly, together or
successively. Exercise of any such right or remedy shall not be deemed an election of
remedies. Failure to exercise any right or remedy shall not be deemed a waiver of any
existing or subsequent default nor a waiver of any such right or remedy.
4,

Governing Law, Severability.

4.1.
Governing Law. This Promissory Note has been executed under and
shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
4.2.
Severability. If any provision of this Promissory Note is found by a
court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable as written, then the parties
intend and desire that (a) such provision shall be enforceable to the full extent permitted by
law and (b) the invalidity or unenforceability of such provision shall not affect the validity and
enforceability of the remainder of this Promissory Note.
5.
Amendment. This Promissory Note may not be amended, modified or
changed, nor shall any provision hereof be deemed waived, except only by an instrument in
writing signed by the party against whom enforcement of any such waiver, amendment,
change or modification is sought.
6.
Binding Agreement.
successors and assigns of Maker.

This Promissory Note shall be binding upon the

7.
Security. The payment of this Promissory Note is secured by a deed of trust
and a security agreement, each dated the same date as this Promissory Note.
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This Promissory Note is intended to be effective as of the date and year first above
written.
PC
CRANE
SERVICE
LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY, a Utah limited
liability company

By:~~7P Stefa^S
^/_3s£s('
Name:
j^&fcltttcZfff,,
Title:
p>/L&9
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Triple 7 Crane sale
Compound Period

*

: Monthly

Nominal Annual Rate....
Effective Annual Rate...
Periodic Rate
Daily Rate
•

10.000 %
10.471 %
0.8333 %
0.02740 %

CASH FLOW DATA
Event

Start Date

1 Loan
2 Payment
3 Payment

04/01/2005
05/01/2005
04/01/2008

Amount
177,600.00
2,122.46
152,879.31

Number Period

End Date

1
35 Monthly
1

03/01/2008

AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE - Normal Amortization
Date
Loan
1
2
3
. 4
5
6
7
8
2005
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
2006
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

04/01/2005
05/01/2005
06/01/2005
07/01/2005
08/01/2005
09/01/2005
10/01/2005
11/01/2005
12/01/2005
Totals

01/01/2006
02/01/2006
03/01/2006
04/01/2006
05/01/2006
06/01/2006
07/01/2006
08/01/2006
09/01/2006
10/01/2006
11/01/2006
12/01/2006
Totals
01/01/2007
02/01/2007
03/01/2007
04/01/2007
05/01/2007
06/01/2007
07/01/2007

Payment

Interest

Principal

2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
16,979.68

1,480.00
1,474.65
1,469.25
1,463.80
1,458.32
1,452.78
1,447.20
1.441.57
11,687.57

642.46
647.81
653.21
658.66
664.14
669.68
675.26
680.89
5,292.11

2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
25,469.52
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46

1,435.90
1,430,18
1,424.41
1,418.59
1,412.73
1.406.81
1.400.85
1,394.83
1,388.77
1,382.66
1,376.49
1,370.28
16,842.50
1,364.01
1.357.69
1,351.31
1,344.89
1.338.41
1.331.87
1,325.29

686.56
692.28
698.05
703.87
709.73
715.65
721.61
727.63
733.69
739.80
745.97
752.18
8,627.02
758.45
764.77
771.15
777.57
784.05
790.59
797.17
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Balance
177,600.00
176,957.54
176,309.73
175,656.52
174,997.86
174,333.72
173,664.04
172,988.78
172,307.89

171,621.33
170,929.05
170,231.00
169,527.13.
168,817.40
168,101.75
167.380.14
166,652.51
165,918.82
165,179.02
164,433.05
163,680.87
o>

162,922.42
162,157.65
161,386.50
160,608.93
159,824.88
159,034.29
158,237.12

v
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o
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Triple 7 Crane sale

Date

Payment

Interest

Principal

Balance

28
29
30
31
32
2007

08/01/2007
09/01/2007
10/01/2007
11/01/2007
12/01/2007
Totals

2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
2.122.46
2,122.46
25,469.52

1,318.64
1,311.94
1,305.19
1,298.38
1,291.51
15,939.13

803.82
810.52
817.27
824.08
830.95
9,530.39

157,433.30
156,622.78
155,805.51
154,981.43
154,150.48

33
34
35
36
2008

01/01/2008
02/01/2008
03/01/2008
04/01/2008
Totals

2,122.46
2,122.46
2,122.46
152,879.31
159,246.69

1,284.59
1,277.61
1,270.56
1,263.45
5,096.21

837.87
844.85
851.90
151,615.86
154,150.48

153,312.61
152.467.76
151,615.86

227,165.41

49,565.41

177.600.00

Grand Totals

O.OO
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DEED OF TRUST.
ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS, FIXTURE FILING
AND SECURITY AGREEMENT
NOTICE: THIS DEED OF TRUST ALSO CONSTITUTES
AND IS FILED AS A FIXTURE FILING
This DEED OF TRUST, ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS, and SECURITY
AGREEMENT AND FIXTURE FILING is made as of March 21, 2005, by and among: LACY
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, a Utah limited liability company, whose address is 41 No. Old
Highway, Park City, Utah ('Trustor"); Jay B. Bell, Esq. whose address is 215 South State Street,
12 th floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, as "Trustee;" and MCQUEEN CRANE SERVICES LLC,
whose address is 4014 Nike Drive, West Jordan, Utah 84088, as "Beneficiary." Trustor and
Beneficiary are each sometimes referred to herein as a "Party" and collectively as the "Parties."
1.
Grant in Trust. Trustor hereby grants, transfers, assigns, conveys and warrants to
Trustee IN TRUST, WITH THE POWER OF SALE, all rights, title and interest which Trustor now
has or may later acquire in that certain real property (the "Property") located in Summit County,
State of Utah, described on Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference,
together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements now or hereafter located thereon.
2.
Secured Obligations. Trustor makes the grant, conveyance, transfer and assignment
set forth in Section 1 above for the purpose of securing the following (collectively, the
"Obligations"):
(a)
repayment of all amounts owed by Trustor under that certain Promissory
Note dated October 18, 2004, in the original principal amount of $228,800.00, and all extensions,
modifications, renewals or replacements of the Obligations;
(b)
repayment of all amounts owed by Trustor under that certain Promissory
Note dated October 18, 2004, in the original principal amount of $139,450.00, and all extensions,
modifications, renewals or replacements of the Obligations;
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(c)
repayment of all amounts owed by Trustor under that certain Promissory
Note of even date herewith in the original principal amount of $49,000.00, and all extensions,
modifications, renewals or replacements of the Obligations;
(d)
repayment of all amounts owed by Trustor under that certain Promissory
Note of even date herewith in the original amount of $177,600,00, and all extensions,
modifications, renewals or replacements of the Obligations;
(e)

the payment and performance of each agreement of Trustor contained

herein; and
(f)
the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or
pursuant to the terms of this Deed of Trust, together with interest thereon as provided herein.
3.
Condition of Property. Trustor agrees to comply with all laws, covenants and
restrictions affecting the Property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or
permit any act with respect to the Property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the
character or use of the Property may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not
excluding the general.
4.
Remedies. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein
provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or
demand upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: make or do
the same in such manner and to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect the security
hereof; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security
hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto;
and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute
discretion it may deem necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and
p a y counsel's reasonable fees.
5.
Trustee's Powers. At any time and from time to time upon written request of
Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of this Deed of Trust (in case of full reconveyance,
for cancellation and retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the
indebtedness secured hereby, Trustee may (a) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting
this Deed of Trust or the lien or charge thereof; or (b) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part of
the Property. The grantee in any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled
thereto", and the recitals therein of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness
thereof. Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in this
paragraph.
6.
Events of Default. The occurrence of any one or more of the following events
(including the passage of time, if any, specified therefor) shall constitute an event of default by
Trustor under this Deed of Trust:
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(a)
If Trustor shall fail, refuse or neglect to pay or perform any obligation or
agreement secured hereby, including without limitation the Obligations listed above, for a period of
ten days after Trustor's actual receipt of a notice from Beneficiary, detailing the payment due or the
obligation required to be performed;
(b)
If Trustor shall fail, refuse or neglect to perform and discharge fully and
timely any obligation or agreement required in this Deed of Trust for a period of ten days after
Trustor's actual receipt of a notice from Beneficiary, detailing the payment due or the obligation
required to be performed; and
(c)
If Trustor shall become insolvent or shall file a voluntary petition for relief
under the United States Bankruptcy Code or have filed against Trustor an involuntary petition for
relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code.
7.
No Waiver. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right
hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such right, and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default
shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default.
8.
Notice of Default. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon the occurrence of any event
of default, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of
Beneficiary. In the event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a
written Notice of Default and of election to cause the Property to be sold to satisfy the obligations
hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein the Property or some
part or parcel thereof is situated.
9.
Trustee's Sale. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law, Trustee,
without demand on Trustor, shall be entitled to sell the Property on the date and at the time and
place designated in a Notice of Sale, which Notice of Sale shall be prepared, posted, published, and
mailed as then required by applicable Utah law, provided that any trustee's sale of the Property or
personal property relating thereto shall be held and conducted in accordance with the laws of the
State of Utah.
10.
Mortgage Foreclosure. Upon the occurrence of any event of default hereunder,
. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable
and foreclose this Deed of Trust in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on
real property, and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all costs and expenses
incident thereto, including a reasonable attorneys' fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court.
11Successor Trustee. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing
for record in the office of the County Recorder of each county in which the Property or some part
thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed for record, the
new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the Trustee named herein or
any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice
thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
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12.
Successors and Assigns, This Deed of Trust shall apply to, inure to the benefit of,
and bind all parties hereto, their successors and assigns. In this Deed of Trust, whenever the context
requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number
includes the plural.
13.
Governing Law. This Deed of Trust shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Deed of Trust has been executed to be effective as
of the date and year first above written.
TRUSTOR:
LACY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, a
Utah limited liability commuiy

Name:
Its: Member
And By:.

:>g? (VJ-/^^" __

Name:
Its: Member
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UTAH

)$s.

>

On the IS % day of Ae&*
, 2005, personally appeared before me
c~
j>W£ fonfrtc**, VfUzM S^gr^v^'twhose identity is personally known to me or proved
to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence, and who, being by me duly sworn (or affirmed), did say
that he is the Member of LACY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, a Utah limited liability
company, and that said document was signed by him in behalf of said entity.
NOTARY PUBLIC

JOYCPRIGGE
PQ BOK $61748. M83 Newpark Blvd
Perk City. UT 84098
My Commission Expires
November 16, 2008
STATE OF UTAH

CJ^L-

NOTiRY PUBLIC

Residing at: /¥#3

A/c*/f*f&

£ / ' < && & £ < T fi
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

)
)ss.
)

On the /£T^ day of
_ , 2005, personally appeared before me
/)Avg Bffckjtr (/(#*/.&££,£#£rz
_, whose identity is personally known to me or proved
to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence, and who, being by me duly sworn (or affirmed), did say
that he is the Member of LACY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, a Utah limited liability
company, and that said document was signed by him in behalf of said entity.
NOTARY PUBLIC
JOYCPRIGGE
PO 6o* 981748.1483 Newpatk 0(vd
^
°arkCity,UT 84098
A*J
My Commission Expires
y
November 18, 2006

NOT^R^PmU^
Residing at:/¥#5 /[//*/P«^

~
T~~
lAyjz- 6/7y „T?'*/C'

"

STATE OF UTAH
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EXHIBIT "A"
LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY
Beginning at a point north 89 degrees 52'38" West 2445.88 feet along section line and North
2245.55 feet from the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian; and running thence south 43 degrees 58'30" East 450.00 feet; thence South 46
degrees 01'30" West 570.97 feet to a point on a 5629.55 foot radius curve to the right, whose radius
point bears North 48 degrees 17'46" East 5629.55 feet; thence Northwesterly along the arc of said
curve 259.73 feet thru a central angle of 02 degrees 38'37"; thence North 43 degrees 38'43" East
230.50 feet; thence North 28 degrees 56'39" East 135.94 feet; thence North 11 degrees 39'22" East
236.14 feet to the point of beginning.
Excepting therefrom any portion lying within the State Highway 40 right of way.
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/ ^

GUARANTY
As an accommodation of the extension of credit by Central Equipment, L.C.,
a Utah limited liability company and McQueen Masonry, Inc., a Utah corporation
(collectively '"Creditors") to PC Crane Service Limited Liability Company, a Utah limited
liability company ("Borrower") pursuant to a promissory note in the principal amount of
$49,000.00 and one in the amount of $177,600.00, each executed the same date as this
Guaranty (the "Notes") the undersigned guarantors unconditionally, irrevocably and jointly
and severally guarantee to Creditors the prompt and full payment of all sums now or
hereinafter due pursuant to said Notes or otherwise due any of the Creditors by Borrower
pursuant to the Notes and any other debt or obligation of Borrower, notwithstanding
whether said debt is primary or secondary, or whether said debt is liquidated or
unliquidated, absolute or contingent.
The undersigned agree to remain fully bound on this Guaranty
notwithstanding any extension, renewal, forbearance, modification, waiver, or release,
discharge or substitution of any party, collateral or security for the Notes or other debt, and
the undersigned consents to and waives all notice, presentment, demand, protest and notice
of protest or non-payment of same. In the event of default, the Creditors or any of them
may seek payment directly from the undersigned without need to precede first against
Borrower or any other party. The undersigned waives all suretyship defenses generally,
and agrees to remain fully bound until said Note and debt is fully paid.
The undersigned further agrees to jointly and severally pay all reasonable
attorney fees and costs necessary for the enforcement of this Guaranty.

AT'I if
DATED: Masefe

,2005.

Lacy Limited Liability Company, a Utah
limited liability COE

323870_3.DOC
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OPTION T O PURCHASE
AGREEMENT made May
, 2005, by and between PC Crane LLC, a Utah Limited
Liability Company (d.b.a. McQueen Crane Service) located at
("PC Crane"), and
Lon Stam, ("Stam") an individual residing at
.
In consideration of one dollar ($l)and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, it is agreed as follows:
1. OPTION. PC Crane hereby grants to Stam the option to purchase up to a ten percent
(10%) equity ownership interest in PC Crane, which option shall vest pursuant to the following
vesting schedule so long as Stam continues to actively provide crane brokering services to PC
Crane (the "Option").
Vesting Schedule
Ownership Interest
Five Percent (5%)
Ten Percent (10%)

Vesting Date
,2010
,2015

2. PURCHASE PRICE. The purchase price payable for the Option shall be one dollar
($1), to be paid by Stam to PC Crane upon exercise of this Option.
3.
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION.
In addition to the good and valuable
consideration herein provided, Stam agrees that the referral fee paid by PC Crane to Stam for crane
brokering services shall hence forth be _____ percent of the total monetary compensation paid to
PC Crane for each job brokered by Stam.
4. EXERCISE OF OPTION. This Option shall only be exercisable by Stam at the
moment prior to sale, dissolution, or ending of PC Crane, and shall not entitle Stam to challenge,
impede, or otherwise delay any sale or disposition of said ownership interest. Stam shall also be
responsible for a share of the expenses, equal to the proportion of his ownership interest, arising
out of the sale or disposition of said property, including payment of liens or other loans.
5. NOTICE. PC Crane shall notify Stam, in writing, at least (10) days prior to
any sale, dissolution, or ending. Failure to provide Stam with the required notice shall act to void
and nullify any sale or voluntary dissolution or ending of the company. All notices provided for in
this option to purchase shall be sent by certified mail with return receipt requested.
6. NATURE OF OPTION. This Option granted herein is of an equity interest only and
does not entitle Stam to an interest in the current profits or losses of the company or in the ongoing
management of the company.
7. T E R M S AND CONDITIONS.
(a) ASSIGNMENT. This Option is personal to the Purchaser and may not
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be assigned by him without the express written consent of Seller. Such consent may be
unreasonably withheld for any reason. Any unauthorized assignment shall be void, and shall
terminate the purchaser's rights in the option. In the event of Stam's death prior to the exercise of
this Option, this Option shall expire and henceforth be void.
(b) GOVERNING LAW. This Option to purchase shall be interpreted under the laws of
the State of Utah, and any action to enforce any of the terms of this option to purchase shall be
brought in Salt Lake County in the State of Utah.
(c) BINDING EFFECT. This Option to purchase shall be binding upon the parties, their
heirs, legal representatives, successors, and assigns.
(d) ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This Option to purchase supersedes all prior agreements
between the parties relating to its subject matter. There are not other understandings or agreements
between them concerning the subject matter.

In witness whereof the parties have signed this option to purchase on the
May, 2005.

PC Crane LLC

By:
Paul Belcher (Manager/Owner)

By:
David Belcher (Owner)

By:
Vernon Belcher (Owner)
Lon Stam

X
(Individually)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law
School, BYU.
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A B R I E F HISTORY O F M C Q U E E N C R A N E S E R V I C E
Established in 1999 McQueen Crane Services is a spin-off business of McQueen
Masonry. Mr. McQueen acquired his first lattice crane in the late 1970's to be used in his
masonry company. As his masonry contracting services grew to include such projects as;
the Huntsman Cancer institute and Logan Temple renovation so did his crane service.
Mr. McQueen takes full management charge for his masonry company, the crane
service and other business endeavors a reality that has left him with very little time.
Time restraints and the established growing market position of the cranes were the factors
that led him to decide it was time to sell the business. He also acknowledged that his
time restraints left him with the inability to realize the crane companies full potential.
After finishing a second Masters degree with an entrepreneurial and business
finance focus, long time friend of Mr. McQueen and his family, Paul Belcher expressed
an interest in acquiring the crane service. In order to guarantee success for the growing
concern that is McQueen Crane, Paul Belcher felt it wise to undertake the business
venture with his father, Dave Belcher and his uncle, Vem Belcher.
Paul's father and uncle are equal partners in the ownership of Park City Towing.
They have owned Park City Towing for the last 10 years successfully growing annual
revenues from a few thousand dollars to over a million. The company is an independent
AAA contractor and services all insurance contracts in the Park City area including (All
State, State Farm, Cross Country, Geico, and Progressive). Currently 70% of the income
is contract generated. Resumes for all three top management members are included in
(Exhibit 1).
One of the primary advantages of going into the crane industry with Dave and
Vern is the fact that many of the skills required to operate within the crane service
industry are readily transferable from the towing industry. Park City Towing owns heavy
duty tow trucks, which are basically 20 ton cranes. Furthermore, Park City Towing
continues to provide Dave and Vem with their current living wages. The investment into
a crane company was appealing to Dave and Vern because of complimenting cyclical
cash flows. The crane industry has higher cash flow in the summer and the towing
company has higher cash flows in the winter.
One of our key goals when we purchased McQueen Crane was to increase crane
usage through a more proactive sales approach. At the time of purchase in 2004
McQueen Crane Service had never employed a full time marketing person and averaged
a 43% (this means the cranes worked an average of 5 months a year) crane usage rate
over the three years periods of 2002, 2003, and 2004. Our goal, that we projected with
Jordan Credit Union, was to increase the usage to a rate of 65% (working the cranes an
average of 754 months a year). After completing the full year of 2005 we exceeded our
goal finishing the year with a 72% usage rate. Our ability to increase the companies crane
usage by 28% resulted in a 45% increase in revenue from 2004 to 2005. Please refer to
(Exhibit 2).
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In our efforts to build a strong marketing position we searched out one of the most
well connected crane brokers in the entire region. Lon Stam the owner of Associated
Crane has more than 30 years of brokering crane service in Utah. Lon Stam has provided
a high level of credibility to our crane company. Lease refer to (Exhibit 3) for a full list
of our diversified clientele.
One of the operational decisions that we and Lon collaborated on was in the
building of a custom designed trailer that gives us the ability to use our 300 ton hydraulic
Liebherr crane as either a 300 ton crane or a 165 ton crane. This is the primary reason for
the drastic increase in the annual revenue production of this machine. The 300 ton crane
alone reached a usage rate of 73% compared to a 21% usage rate in 2004 resulting in a
71% increase in this cranes annual revenue generation.

THE

225Q

AND

M25Q

MANITOWOC C R A W L E R S

The crawler cranes are the next business endeavor that we are collaborating with
Lon to undertake. The opportunity to purchase the crawlers come via Lon through a long
time business associate Gordon Olsen. One of the key reasons for our interest in moving
forward with the purchase of these specific cranes is because of the fact that we are in
essence buying our competition resulting in a better market share for McQueen Crane
Service. If we were to buy two different cranes and bring them into the state we would be
in competition with Gordon Olsen. However, by buying his cranes we are basically buying
his business. Please refer to letter of intent for terms of the sell and bare rental (Exhibit 4).
We would like to provide a brief history of the 2250 and M250 cranes. In the late
nineties Salt Lake City was awarded the Olympic bid and shortly there after the 1-15
freeway project was approved. The goal of the state was to keep the construction
contracts in the hands of local contractors. However, at the time there were no cranes in
the state large enough to undertake a project of this scale.
Gordon Olsen's primary business is the fabrication and erection of bridges. His
company was the only one large enough in the state to fulfill the 1-15 steel bridge
contract. Once Gordon was awarded the steel contract he collaborated with Lon on
determining the cranes that would be required to complete the project. It was determined
that Manitowoc's M250 and 2250 series cranes with Max-er attachments would ideally
fit the job. Please refer to (Exhibit 5) for full specs and appraisals of the cranes.
Gordon arrange a lease buy option with the Manitowoc factor for three new
cranes. Gordon never intended to enter into the crane rental business he only intended to
use the cranes to complete the M 5 project. However, once the 1-15 project was
completed Gordon was contacted by several business interested in putting the cranes on
other projects. Gordon always intended to sell the cranes once LI5 was complete. He
has been unable to sell them due to the fact that they have moved from project to project
almost non-stop over that last 3 years.
BAF 0154
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Gordon's company was recently awarded the contract to erect a new bridge that
will span the Hoover dam canyon. It will be the tallest bridge ever erected in the entire
country. Due to this recent contract and Gordon's advance age he has determined that it
is time to sell the cranes. He contacted Lon to see if he would have any interest in
purchasing the cranes. Lon quickly brought the investment opportunity to us. And once
again as soon as we agreed to purchase the cranes they are already out working. As of
for now the cranes will both be on guaranteed projects that will continue through the next
eight months. Furthermore, we have not even purchased the cranes yet and have already
had several inquires from businesses interested in their availability.

FINANCING
In March of 2004 we were interested in purchasing another crane from Mr.
McQueen. We wanted to purchase his 1999 Manitowoc 777T. However, due to the fact
that we had closed the Jordan Credit Union loan only months earlier we were unable to
acquire financing. Dave Belcher was visiting with his neighbor and friend Mitch Jensen
of Siegfried & Jensen and he mentioned the difficulties in obtaining financing. Mitch
expressed an interest in exploring the possibilities of collaborating on the financing.
Siegfried & Jensen were interested in possible tax depreciation advantages.
Valerie Swaner of Zions Bank Equipment Leasing was consulted for
recommendations of structuring a lease that would facilitate both the purchase of the
crane and the depreciation benefits. Valerie is one of Zions Bank Leasing specialists and
has worked on many different types of lease structures and was able to create a funding
strategy that benefited both parties. The purchase of the crane was finalized in March of
2004. (Jim Miller has been provided with all the lease structure paper work and is using
it as a model for the funding of the 2250 and the M250 cranes.)
All parties involved; Dave Belcher, Vern Belcher, Paul Belcher, PC Crane
Service DBA: McQueen Crane, Park City Towing, Mitch Jensen, Ned Siegfried, S&J
Leasing and Siegfried & Jensen all understand their full responsibilities as guarantors on
the loan to purchase the 2250 & M250.
McQueen Crane's funding strategies and funding collaborations are considered
proprietary information. We consider the information of whom we finically collaborate
with as PRIVATE. We expect that this information will only be used in the strictest of
confidence.

Prepared by:
McQueen Crane Service
For any additional questions please contact us
801-688-3250
Or mcqueencrane@yahoo.com
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Letter of sale terms and bare rental agreement
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ID

CONTRACTORS • ENGINEERS • CRANE RENTAL

December 15,2005

P.C Crane
4115 Atkinson Avenue
P. O. Box 980921
Park city, Utah 84098
ATT: Mr. Vem Belcher
REF: Crane Purchase
Dear Van,
OLSENBBAL agrees that it will sell to P.C. Crane on a cash sale basis on 01-03-06 the
following listed equipment in accordance with the terms and conditions listed herein:
1 - Manitowae M2250 Crawler Crane
Serial No. M-225-1020
With Maxer 225 Heavy Lift Attachment
Full 200 ft. Luffing Jib Attachment
Price: 52,500,000.00

D

1 Manitowae M250 Crawler Crane
Serial No. M250-1109
With Maxer 225 Heavy Lift Attachment
Full 200 Ft. Luffing Jib Attachment
Price: $2,400,000.
TERMS:
$3,950,000.00 - Cash at closing on January 3,2006. The title will remain with
OLSENBBAL until closing. OLSENBEAL agrees to cany a non-interest bearing note
for $950,000.00 with no payments due for 1 year.
To facilitate this transaction, OLSENBEAL will pay P.C. Crane a rental rate of
$32,000.00 per month for at least one (1) crane that will be operated and maintained and
insured by OLSENBEAL for a period of six (6) months. In fee event, that the second
crane is out on a rental, these same arrangements would be applicable for however long
that rental
rental period
period would
would be.
be.
that
Gordon L. Olsen - President
Olsen-Beal Associates

O

Vettt Belcher - Vjfee President
P.C. Crane

1490 Wost 200 South • Ltrvdon, UT 640*2 • 601/765-6886 • FAX 601/785-0088
w&bsite - www.olsenboaLporri • email ^ Info(g>oisenb&e1,com
UT Uc. #411297 • GA'Uc. *685>456 • NV Uc. O33460
ID Lfo. *536r-AAA-123 • AZ Lie.. #$26650 • OR Uc. V148059
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Jb- Southwest 18gii
^ y *
A Divkloh of SME Industries, fnc
lNovcmbcrll > 2005
Via Facsimile & Mail
OLSENBEAL
1490 West 200 South
Liridon, Utah 84042

'

?"? ^
^
J/V/
^

^ " ^

nr f

Attention:

Mr. Steve L. Olsen

Reference:

Planet Hollywood
SWS Project No. 91156

Subject:

Crane Rental -Purchase Order

Dear Steve:
71ns letter serves as your Purchase Order No. 91156-8001 tofiimishrental for (1) Manitowoc
2250 Crane with 180% main boom, 160* luffing jib and 100'fixedjib in accordance with
following:
Purchase Order Price Base on the .Following:
See attached Olscnbeal revised Proposal dated 10/5/05 Lo MJ, Dean.
Mobilize & Assemble

$45,000.00

Crane work day

79 days @ $2,5)20.00/ day = $230,6*80-00

Standby

41 days ©$1,650.00/ day « $67,650.00

Disassemble & Move Out

Based O J I M J . Dean
> Crane Schedule

$45.000.00
Projected Totals

$388,330,00

Schedule of Work

•

See MJ. Dean Crane Schedule dated 9/23/05 attached.
Scoioe of Work

'

*

Furnish all equipment, labor and material required for the rental of (1) Manitowoc 2250
Crane for the above referenced project.

v
200 Sunpac Avenue, Henderson. Nevada 89015

BAF0173
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From: N/A

NO 5 0 5

2.2006y> 1 *-44PM

U

P. 4

*"

K 003/003

OLSEHBeAL
November 11, 2005
Page2of2
Terms of Payment
Invoice to be submitted by the 15th of each monlh, SME Steel Contractors will issue
payments.
The following information and attachments arc to be included with each invoice:
SWS Job No. 91156
Phase Code No. 8001
Billing Period
Attachments included with each invoice:
Timeticketsfor labor Sc equipment sign daily by M. J. Dean.
Southwest Steel is confident that Oisenbeal will do thcirutmost to maintain Southwest SteePs
reputation for quality and ability to maintain schedule requirements. Please acknowledge
accept-dnce of the above by signing below and returning (fax is acceptable) to our office.
Should you have any questions or comments please do not hesitate to contact me.
Accepted
Sincerely,
SOUTHWEST STEEL

By:

'

OLSEt$&EAL

Name:

( ^

Title: &dM*y
Teny H.Walker
Senior Project Manager
cc:

S*t**«j-

o^Jhlt^L

9U56.obc
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